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A Mirage of Market Allocation
YANNAI A. GONCZAROWSKI, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Microsoft Research
MOSHE TENNENHOLTZ, Technion — Israel Institute of Technology
Market Allocation — a situation where competitors agree to not compete with each
other in specific markets, by dividing up geographic areas, types of products, or types
of customers. West’s Encyclopedia of American Law, 2nd Edition, Volume 9, Page 168
Can noncooperative behaviour of merchants lead to a market split that prima facie seems anticompetitive?
We introduce a model in which service providers, with internet service providers (ISPs) being the main
example, aim at optimizing the number of customers who use their services, while customers aim at choosing
service providers with low customer load (which translates to high effective bandwidth per subscriber, in the
case of ISPs). Each service provider chooses between a variety of levels of service (latencies, in the case of
ISPs), and as long as it does not lose customers, aims at minimizing its level of service; the minimum level of
service required to satisfy a customer varies across customers. We consider a two-stage competition, in the
first stage of which the service providers select their levels of service, and in the second stage — customers
choose between the service providers. (We show via a novel construction that for any choice of strategies
for the service providers, a unique distribution of the customers’ mass between them emerges from all Nash
equilibria among the customers, showing the incentives of service providers in this two-stage game to be
well defined.) In the two-stage game, we show that the competition among the service providers possesses a
unique Nash equilibrium, which is moreover super-strong; we also show that all sequential better-response
dynamics of service providers reach this equilibrium, with best-response dynamics doing so surprisingly
fast. If service providers choose their levels of service according to this equilibrium, then the unique Nash
equilibrium among customers in the second phase is essentially a split of the market between the service
providers, based on the customers’ minimum acceptable quality of service; moreover, each service provider’s
chosen level of service is the lowest acceptable by the entirety of the slice of the market that chooses it,
seemingly making no attempt to attract any other customers. Our results show that this prima facie market
allocation (collusive split of the market) arises as the unique and highly robust outcome of noncooperative
(i.e. free from any form of collusion), even myopic, service-provider behaviour. The results of this paper are
applicable to a wide variety of scenarios, from explaining phenomena observable in some food markets, to
shedding a surprising light on aspects of location theory, such as the formation and structure of a city’s
central business district.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Setting
1.1.1. Shopping for an Internet Connection. In today’s world, an internet connection has
become a necessity in many households. Of the many parameters characterizing an
internet connection, two have emerged as most important to the home user:1 the ever-
popular bandwidth, and the latency2. While the bandwidth measures the amount of
data transmitted (equivalently, received) per second, the latency measures the time it
takes a single packet of data to reach its destination.3 In the metaphorical highway
1Indeed, these are precisely the two parameters measured by the popular internet speed-testing website
www.speedtest.net.
2Twice the latency is sometimes referred to as the ping time.
3We emphasize that high latency corresponds to bad quality of service.
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of the internet, the bandwidth may be thought of as corresponding to the number of
lanes, while the latency corresponds the the length of the highway. While some users
may not be sensitive to latency (indeed, when streaming a 45-minute TV show from,
say, Netflix or Hulu, most users would not mind waiting an extra second before the
show begins; this is also the case when downloading content for future offline con-
sumption), some other users may have very harsh latency limitations (indeed, when
playing a multiplayer video game online, it is extremely important for each player that
whenever she presses a button on her controller, the associated action happens as soon
as possible; a delay longer that of the adversary by as little as one tenth of a second
may be unacceptable).
We consider a stylized model, in which each customer is interested in precisely one
internet connection, and is willing to tolerate a latency of at most d milliseconds (a
customer-dependent real value). As long as this customer’s latency demand is met, her
sole consideration is that of maximizing her effective bandwidth (we think of subscrip-
tion costs as low and similar, as is the case in real life). The effective bandwidth of each
customer subscribed to a given internet service provider, or ISP, is the total bandwidth
available to this ISP (a fixed known ISP-dependent value) divided by the number of
customers subscribed to this ISP.4 A Nash equilibrium among the customers is there-
fore an assignment of ISPs to customers, s.t. for each customer with latency limit d, no
ISP with latency no greater than d has a subscriber pool smaller than that of the ISP
assigned to this customer.
We consider a scenario with finitely many ISPs and continuously many customers,
the distribution of d among whom is given by an arbitrary finite measure. Preparing
the ground for the main results of this paper, which follow below, in Section 3 we use
a novel construction to show the following result (similar in spirit to other results
regarding congestion games and crowding games).
THEOREM 1.1 (INFORMAL VERSION OF THEOREMS 3.10 AND 3.11, COROL-
LARY 3.12, AND ALGORITHM 1). Fix the characteristics (latency and total bandwidth)
of n ISPs.
(1) A Nash equilibrium among the customers exists. Furthermore, there exists such a
Nash equilibrium for which the strategies can be computed efficiently.
(2) The effective bandwidth of each customer, as well as the number of subscribers to
each ISP, are the same across all Nash equilibria.
1.1.2. An ISP Game. Obviously, each ISP would like to offer a latency that maximizes
its number of subscribers. (By Theorem 1.1, the number of subscribers is well defined
given the latencies of all ISPs, assuming a Nash equilibrium among the customers.)
That being said, as low-latency infrastructure is costlier to erect, each ISP would like
to offer the highest latency possible, as long as this does not reduce the size of its sub-
scriber pool. As we think of the number of subscribers as indicative of monthly income,
and of the investment in infrastructure as a one-time expense (with infrastructure up-
keep cost being independent of latency), we have that each ISP would like to offer a
latency that first and foremost maximizes its number of subscribers, and only then (as
a tie-breaking rule among latency values that yield the same number of subscribers)
is as high as possible. In Section 4.2, and more generally in Section 5, we show the
following — the first of our main results regarding this two-stage competition.
4In Section 5, we deal with a generalized model, which accommodates also for, e.g. some ISPs purchasing
more total bandwidth as their subscriber pool grows. Our main results surveyed in the introduction continue
to hold even under such generalizations.
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THEOREM 1.2 (INFORMAL VERSION OF THEOREMS 4.28 AND 5.2).
(1) For every ordering pi of the n ISPs, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium among
them s.t. their latency levels are ordered according to pi.
(2) This Nash equilibrium is super-strong.5
(3) Each ISP has the same number of subscribers in all Nash equilibria (regardless of
the chosen ordering of ISPs pi).
We further demonstrate the robustness of the Nash equilibrium defined in Theo-
rem 1.2 by considering dynamics among ISPs. A sequential best-response dynamic is a
process starting with arbitrary latency levels, and in which at each turn an arbitrary
ISP changes its latency level to one that, ceteris paribus, maximizes its preferences
(we show that such a latency level always exists for every possible measure on cus-
tomers latency limits); we assume that each ISP is allowed to change its latency level
infinitely often. A round in a best-response dynamic is a sequence of consecutive steps
in which each ISP is allowed to change its latency level at least once. Finally, a sequen-
tial δ-better-response dynamic is a sequential dynamic in which each change in latency
need not necessarily maximize the ISP’s preferences, as long as it increases the size of
its subscriber pool by at least δ of the entire market size.6 In Section 4.2, we show the
following main result.
THEOREM 1.3 (INFORMAL VERSION OF COROLLARIES 4.37 AND 4.38).
(1) For every δ > 0, every sequential δ-better-response dynamic reaches a Nash equilib-
rium in finitely many steps, and remains constant from that point onward.
(2) Sequential best-response dynamics reach a Nash equilibrium in a small number of
rounds.
We also analyse dynamics in which several ISPs change their latency levels simul-
taneously. (See Theorems 4.15 and 4.22 and Corollary 4.35.) We emphasize that The-
orem 1.3 does not stem from any “hidden” introduction of any exogenous costs on re-
structuring infrastructure; i.e. this theorem holds in very general settings, even when
the utility of an ISP from a given number of subscribers and a given latency does not
decrease with the number of latency changes in previous steps of the studied dynamics.
1.1.3. Prima Facie Market Allocation. Our study culminates with the analysis of the struc-
ture of the unique equilibrium from Theorem 1.2 and of the underlying equilibrium
among customers, which turns out to be unique as well
THEOREM 1.4 (INFORMAL VERSION OF THEOREMS 4.28, 4.31 AND 5.2). Fix a
Nash equilibrium among the ISPs. Denote the number of subscribers to the first ISP
(the one with lowest latency) by `1, the number of subscribers to the second ISP (the one
with second-lowest latency) by `2, and so forth.
(1) The `1 customers with smallest latency limits all subscribe to the first ISP, whose
latency is the highest that still accommodates all of these customers.
(2) The next `2 customers all subscribe to the second ISP, whose latency is the highest
that still accommodates all of these customers.
(3) etc.
5See Theorem 4.6 in Section 4.1 and the preceding discussion for the definition of super-strong equilibrium.
6Since we consider continuously many customers, we demand a δ-improvement in order to avoid improve-
ments a` la Zeno’s “Race Course” paradox.
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Theorem 1.4 shows that the market is split among the various ISPs based on
the willingness of a customer to accept a high latency level, and each ISP
chooses the highest latency level acceptable by the entirety of its slice of the
market, seemingly making no attempt to attract any other customers. Theo-
rems 1.2 and 1.3 show that this prima facie market allocation (collusive split of the
market) among the various ISPs arises as the unique possible outcome, not as a result
of anticompetitive practices, but rather as a result of noncooperative dynamics, each
ISP only looking to myopically maximize its preferences at every step; no signalling
(via e.g. choice of latency level) or any other collusive or cooperative “trick” whatsoever
is used in order to reach and maintain this market split.
1.2. Alternative Interpretations/Applications
It is worthwhile to point out that our framework captures far more than merely the
ISP-competition scenario introduced above, by thinking of a latency level more gener-
ally as a quality of service (QoS) of sorts of an ISP: the lower the latency of an ISP, the
better the quality of service that it provides. In Sections 6 and 7, we give two examples
of other possible applications stemming from this insight. In each of these examples,
QoS is given different meanings, which, in turn, result in different meanings of mar-
ket split based on acceptable QoS. These examples provide insights into the breadth
of meanings that can be captured by the idea of QoS and consequently by our model,
and into the meaning of market split based on acceptable QoS. The example given in
Section 6 gives an application to location theory, and derives results for an extended
model with multiple types of goods. The example given in Section 7 offers real-world
evidence supporting the applicability of our model to certain food markets.
For generality, we henceforth use the more generic term producers to refer to e.g.
ISPs, consumers to refer to e.g. customers, and QoS to refer to e.g. latency.
1.3. Related Work
Our consumer games are a form of congestion games, and more specifically, of resource-
selection games. Congestion games with finitely many players have been introduced by
Rosenthal [1973]; in fact, the term has been coined in a paper by Monderer and Shap-
ley [1996], titled “Potential Games”, where it is shown that a game has a potential iff
it is a congestion game. While the discussion there refers to atomic games with finitely
many players, work in computer science and game theory also deals with nonatomic
games, in which there may be a continuum of players as in our model (see e.g. [Rough-
garden and Tardos 2002] for work in CS that uses such games). While substantial
parts of our introductory Theorem 1.1 can also be deduced from results by by Schmei-
dler [1973] and by Beckmann et al. [1956], we emphasize that the novel constructive
machinery that we introduce in order to prove it is simpler, allows for efficient calcula-
tion, provides for more general results, and provides for auxiliary results useful in the
analysis of our producer game and in obtaining our main results. Holzman and Law-
Yone [1997, 2003] look at restrictions on strategy sets of atomic congestion games; one
way to view our consumer games is as a special form of restricted nonatomic congestion
games defined for general measure functions on agents’ types, capturing their possible
strategy sets. As it turns out, this set of games possess many desired game-theoretic
properties.
The actual games that we study are in fact two-stage games, where the second stage
is a congestion game as discussed above; the first stage can be viewed as a form of
facility-location game among producers, with QoS playing the role of location (see Sec-
tion 6), where the main aim of producers is to select a QoS to be selected by as many
consumers as possible. This resembles the literature on location theory initiated by
Hotelling [1929], although the utility function of the producers in our setting is differ-
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ent, and allows for fine preferences based on distance from a location most preferred
by consumers. Given the above, our model can be viewed as a novel combination of
facility-location games among producers with congestion games among consumers.
Another type of related literature deals with scheduling and queuing with multiple
machines, where the jobs choose among available services and the level of service they
receive depends on the selections by other jobs. Recently, two-stage games in these
contexts have been studied, consisting of a strategic selection by machines between
queuing policies [Ashlagi et al. 2013] or scheduling policies [Ashlagi et al. 2010], fol-
lowed by a strategic selection by jobs between the various selected policies. Our work
introduces a novel type of a two-stage scenario, which may be considered as some-
what related. More remotely is the literature on competing mechanisms in the context
of auctions, which employs such two-phase setting, but in a very different context of
mechanism design with money (see e.g. [McAfee 1993]).
The proof of Theorem 1.1 draws its intuition from an analogy to a hydraulic sys-
tem of communicating vessels (see Fig. 1). Kaminsky [2000] (see also [Aumann 2002])
uses an analogy to quite a different system of communicating vessels to solve rationing
problems; his motivation is quite different, and involves extending bilateral rationing
rules. While Kaminsky uses a set of two-way communicating vessels, we use a set of
one-way communicating vessels. In this context, the problem of finding a Nash equi-
librium among consumers may be regarded as a rationing problem with certain “re-
serves” for producers with high quality of service. Our treatment, especially in light of
the discussion in Section 5 (see in particular Fig. 2), also sheds new light on rationing
problems, as congestion games of sorts among a continuum of good-fragments.
2. NOTATION
Definition 2.1 (Notation).
— (Naturals). We denote the natural numbers by N , {0, 1, 2, . . .}.
— (Nonnegative Reals). We denote the nonnegative reals by R≥ , {r ∈ R | r ≥ 0}.
— (Maximizing Arguments). Given a set S and a function f : S → R that attains
a maximum value on S, we denote the set of arguments in S maximizing f by
arg Maxs∈S f(s) , {s ∈ S | f(s) = m}, where m , Maxs∈S f(s).
— (Simplex). For a finite set S and a nonempty subset S′ ⊆ S, we define
∆S
′
=
{
s ∈ [0, 1]S
∣∣∣ ∑
j∈S′
sj = 1 & ∀j ∈ S \ S′ : sj = 0
}
.
(The set S will be clear from context.)
— For every n ∈ N, we define Pn , {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}.
— Given a tuple t¯ = (t0, . . . , tn−1) ∈ SPn for some set S and some n ∈ N, and given j ∈ Pn
and t′ ∈ S, we define (t¯−j , t′) , (t0, . . . , tj−2, tj−1, t′, tj+1, tj+2, . . . , tn−1) ∈ SPn .
— For every n ∈ N, we denote the set of permutations on Pn by Pn!.
3. PRELUDE: THE CONSUMER (CUSTOMER) GAME
Preparing the ground for the main results of this paper, in this section we define the
congestion game among consumers, and use a novel construction7 to prove the exis-
tence of Nash equilibrium and the uniqueness of equilibrium loads, and to efficiently
7See Gonczarowski and Tennenholtz [2014] for a significant, highly nontrivial, generalization of our treat-
ment of only the consumer game (without the producer game) to arbitrary resource-selection games (in
which the resources available to a player may be any subset of Pn and not merely a “QoS-prefix” of Pn to
which the construction of this section is inherently tailored) and beyond.
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calculate these loads.8 Full proofs and auxiliary results are provided in Appendices A.1
and A.2.
In this section and in Section 4, for ease of presentation, we present a model in which
each consumer would like to consume from a least-loaded producer (i.e. in which all
ISPs have the same total bandwidth); we remove this requirement in Section 5.
Definition 3.1 (Quality-of-Service Space). For ease of presentation, we use T , [0, 1]
as the type space in the consumer game (and later as the strategy space in the producer
game). We consider lower values as indicating better qualities of service.
For the duration of this section, fix a finite measure µ on T , a natural n ∈ N and
producer QoS levels (e.g. ISP latencies) t¯ = (t0, . . . , tn−1) ∈ T Pn . We consider the n-
producers consumer game (µ; t¯) = (µ; t0, . . . , tn−1), which we now define.
Definition 3.2 (Strategies). For every d ∈ T , we define the set of strategies available
to a player with type (i.e. worst acceptable QoS) d as Sd , {j | tj ≤ d} ∪ {¬}, where ¬
denotes not consuming from any producer. We define S , ∪d∈T Sd = Pn ∪{¬}— the set
of pure strategies available to any player, and consider S as a measurable space with
the σ-algebra 2S of all of its subsets.
Definition 3.3 (Pure-Consumption Profile/Nash Equilibrium).
(1) A pure-consumption (strategy) profile in the n-producers consumer game (µ; t¯) is a
measurable function s : T → S s.t. s(d) ∈ Sd for every d ∈ T .
(2) Given a pure-consumption profile s in the n-producers consumer game (µ; t¯), we
define `sj , µ
(
s−1(j)
)
for every j ∈ S — the load on producer j. (`s¬ is the measure
of consumers not consuming from any producer.)
(3) A pure-consumption Nash equilibrium in the n-producers consumer game (µ; t¯) is
a pure-consumption profile s s.t. for every d ∈ T , both the following hold.
(a) s(d) = ¬ only if Sd = {¬}.
(b) `ss(d) ≤ `sj for every j ∈ Sd \ {¬}.9
We now turn to define mixed-consumption strategies. We think of such a strategy
not as a probabilistic one, but rather as meaning “a certain fraction of the continuum
of players with type d have one strategy, while others have other strategies”.
Definition 3.4 (Mixed-Consumption Profile/Nash Equilibrium).
(1) A mixed-consumption (strategy) profile in the n-producers consumer game (µ; t¯) is
a measurable function s : T → [0, 1]S s.t. s(d) ∈ ∆Sd for every d ∈ T .
(2) Given a mixed-consumption profile s in the n-producers consumer game (µ; t¯), we
define `sj ,
∫
T sj dµ for every j ∈ S — the load on producer j. (`s¬ is the measure of
consumers not consuming from any producer in this case as well.)
(3) A mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium in the n-producers consumer game (µ; t¯) is
a mixed-consumption profile s s.t. for every d ∈ T , both of the following hold.
8As mentioned in Section 1.3, while the existence of Nash equilibrium and the uniqueness of equilibrium
loads can also be derived from theorems by Schmeidler [1973] and by Beckmann et al. [1956], respectively,
the novel constructive machinery that we introduce here is simpler, provides for more general uniqueness
results, provides for auxiliary results useful in analysing dynamics of the producer game in Section 4, and
allows for efficient calculation.
9As mentioned above, our results generalize also for a more general definition of the consumers’ preferences
(capturing, e.g. scenarios in which different ISPs have different bandwidths), in which each consumer con-
sumes from a producer j with minimal fj
(
`sj
)
(as opposed to minimal `sj ), where (fj)j∈Pn is a specification
of an increasing continuous function for each producer. See Section 5 for more details.
Discussion Paper 663, Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Revised: February 11, 2015.
A Mirage of Market Allocation 7
(a) ¬ ∈ supp(s(d)) only if Sd = {¬}.
(b) `sk ≤ `sj for every k ∈ supp
(
s(d)
)
and j ∈ Sd \ {¬}.9
THEOREM 3.5 (∃ PURE-CONSUMPTION NASH EQUILIBRIUM). If µ is atomless, then
a pure-consumption Nash equilibrium exists in the n-producers consumer game (µ; t¯).
Example 3.6 (Necessity of Atomlessness Condition). Consider a nonzero measure µ
concentrated entirely on the atom d = 1 ∈ T . For n > 1, no pure-consumption Nash
equilibrium exists in any induced n-producers consumer game. Indeed, in any pure-
consumption profile, all consumers with type d = 1 would consume from the same
producer, leaving another producer with a strictly lower load of 0; as this producer is
acceptable by all consumers with type d = 1, they would all rather deviate to it.
Definition 3.7 (Effective Type). We say that two types d1, d2 ∈ T are of the same
effective type if Sd1 = Sd2 .
The Nash equilibrium constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.5 is asymmetric in the
sense that players with the same effective type may behave differently. As we mo-
mentarily below, this asymmetry cannot be avoided. Nonetheless, a reader who finds
this asymmetry aesthetically unpleasing may instead consider a more-symmetric, yet
mixed-consumption, Nash equilibrium, which in fact exists even when µ is not atom-
less.
Definition 3.8 (Symmetric Strategy Profile). A strategy profile s is said to be sym-
metric if Sd1 = Sd2 =⇒ s(d1) = s(d2) for every d1, d2 ∈ T , i.e. each player’s strategy
depends only on the player’s effective type.
Example 3.9 (Nonexistence of a Symmetric Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium). Con-
sider any nonzero measure µ. For n > 1, if tj = 0 for every j ∈ Pn, then all con-
sumers are of the same effective type. Thus, no symmetric pure-consumption equi-
librium exists in the induced n-producers consumer game. Indeed, in any symmetric
pure-consumption profile, since all consumers are of the same effective type, all would
consume from the same producer, leaving another producer (acceptable to all) with a
strictly lower load of 0; therefore, all consumers would rather deviate to this producer.
THEOREM 3.10 (∃ SYMMETRIC MIXED-CONSUMPTION NASH EQUILIBRIUM). A
symmetric mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium exists in the n-producers consumer
game (µ; t¯). Furthermore, there exists such an equilibrium for which the strategies can
be computed in O(n2) time.
See Fig. 1 for an illustration of the constructive proof of Theorem 3.10; as illustrated,
the intuition underlying this novel construction builds upon hydraulic systems of com-
municating vessels (nonetheless, the proofs given in Appendix A.1 are completely for-
mal, of course). We now show that while in general many Nash equilibria may exist in
the consumer game, they result in the same load for both consumers and producers.
THEOREM 3.11 (PRODUCERS ARE INDIFFERENT BETWEEN NASH EQUILIBRIA).
`sj = `
s′
j for every j ∈ Pn and every mixed-consumption Nash equilibria s, s′ in (µ; t¯).
COROLLARY 3.12 (CONSUMERS ARE INDIFFERENT BETWEEN NASH EQUILIBRIA).
`sk = `
s′
k′ for every k ∈ supp
(
s(d)
)
and k′ ∈ supp(s′(d)), for every d ∈ T and every mixed-
consumption Nash equilibria s, s′ in (µ; t¯).
By Theorems 3.10 and 3.11, the following is well defined.
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t0 t1 t2 t3 t4
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3 0.0
(a) A set of 5 communicating vessels, corresponding,
from left to right, to producers 0, . . . , 4 respectively.
Each pair of adjacent vessels is connected via a no-
return valve, allowing the flow of liquids from right
to left, but not the other way around.
t0 t1 t2 t3 t4
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3 0.0
(b) Pouring µ
(
[t0, t1)
)
liquid into the first vessel. The
liquid does not penetrate the second vessel due to the
no-return valve between these two vessels.
t0 t1 t2 t3 t4
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3 0.0
(c) Pouring µ
(
[t1, t2)
)
liquid into the second vessel.
t0 t1 t2 t3 t4
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3 0.0
(d) Pouring µ
(
[t2, t3)
)
liquid into the third vessel.
Once the liquid surface level in the third vessel
equals that in the second, any additional liquid
causes spillage into the second vessel, maintaining
even surface level among these two vessels.
t0 t1 t2 t3 t4
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3 0.0
(e) Pouring µ
(
[t3, t4)
)
liquid into the fourth vessel.
t0 t1 t2 t3 t4
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3 0.0
(f) Pouring µ
(
[t4, t5)
)
liquid into the fifth vessel.
Some of the liquid penetrates into the fourth vessel,
and later into the third and second vessels, so that
no vessel has lower surface level than any vessel on
its right.
Fig. 1. Illustration of the construction in the proof of Theorem 3.10 for n = 5. E.g. as exactly 80% of the
blue (i.e. darkest when viewed in b/w) liquid in Fig. 1(f) is in the third vessel and the remaining 20% is in
the second one, the strategy for all consumer types d ∈ [t2, t3) in the symmetric mixed-consumption Nash
equilibrium that we construct is 0.8 consumption from producer 2 and 0.2 consumption from producer 1.
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Definition 3.13 (Producer Load). For every j ∈ Pn, we define `j(t¯) to equal `sj in any
mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium s in (µ; t¯).
By the proof of Theorem 3.10, we obtain Algorithm 1 — a simple algorithm for di-
rectly calculating `j(t¯) for all j, without the need to first calculate consumer’s strate-
gies. While this algorithm runs in O(n2) time, i.e. has same worst-case asymptotic
behaviour as explicitly computing a Nash equilibrium via Theorem 3.10 and then de-
ducing all loads, it is considerably simpler, and also computes the loads sequentially,
and so may be stopped mid-way, allowing to calculate the loads on the j producers with
lowest latency levels in O(j · n) time for any j.
ALGORITHM 1 Direct computation of `j(t¯) for all j ∈ Pn
1: procedure COMPUTE-`(µ; t0, . . . , tn−1) // Assumes t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tn−1.
2: tn ← 2 // Any value > 1 will do here; assumes µ is defined on [0, tn], but has support T .
3: `¬ ← µ
(
[0, t0)
)
4: k ← 0
5: while k < n do
6: k′ ← Max arg Maxk<k′≤n µ([tk,tk′ ))k′−k
7: `← µ([tk,tk′ ))
k′−k
8: for all k ≤ j < k′ do
9: `j ← `
10: end for
11: k ← k′
12: end while
13: return (`¬, `0, . . . , `n−1)
14: end procedure
See Appendix A.2 for an analytic study of `j , formalizing some main properties
thereof, which we utilize in our proofs in the following sections. In particular, we show
there that for every j, `j(t¯) is nonincreasing in tj , weakly quasiconvex in tk for k 6= j,
and Lipschitz (w.r.t. µ) in each coordinate with Lipschitz constant 1.
4. THE PRODUCER (ISP) GAME
We now turn to the producer game, and to the main results of this paper. In this two-
stage game, each producer chooses a strategy (i.e. QoS) in T , and the utilities are
determined according to the loads on producers in Nash equilibria in the induced con-
sumer game. For the duration of this section, fix a natural n ∈ N and a finite measure µ
on T . Full proofs, as well as auxiliary results, are provided in Appendices A.3 and A.4.
In Section 4.1, we define a simplified version of the producer game; the definition
of the (more intricate) producer game that is surveyed in the introduction is given in
Section 4.2. While the simpler game defined in Section 4.1 has some trivialities that we
point out, its analysis is nonetheless interesting, and the obtained results are useful
when analysing the more-involved version in Section 4.2.
Recall that as in Section 3, for ease of presentation we present a model in which
each consumer would like to consume from a least-loaded producer (i.e. in which all
ISPs have the same total bandwidth); as noted above, we remove this requirement in
Section 5.
4.1. Coarse Preferences (A Simplified Producer Game)
Definition 4.1 (Producer Game with Coarse Preferences). We define the producer
game with coarse preferences (n, µ,C) as the n-player game, with set of players (called
producers) Pn, in which the pure-strategy space available to each producer is T , and
Discussion Paper 663, Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Revised: February 11, 2015.
10 Y. A. Gonczarowski and M. Tennenholtz
in which for each pure-strategy profile t¯ ∈ T Pn , the utility for each producer j ∈ Pn is
strictly increasing in `j(t¯) (as defined in Definition 3.13).
4.1.1. Static Analysis. We begin with an analysis of domination in the producer game
with coarse preferences, pointing out the trivialities in this simplified game, which will
disappear in the more-involved version thereof that we analyse in Section 4.2.
Definition 4.2 (Safe Alternative; Dominant Strategy). Let t be a strategy in the
game (n, µ,C).
— We say that t is a safe alternative to some strategy t′ if for every strategy profile for
all but one of the producers, playing t gives the remaining producer utility at least as
high a utility as playing t′.
— We say that t is a dominant strategy if it is a safe alternative to all strategies.
THEOREM 4.3 (DOMINANT STRATEGIES). t ∈ T is a dominant strategy in (n, µ,C)
iff µ
(
[0, t)
)
= 0. Furthermore, each such dominant strategy guarantees a load of at least
µ(T )
n on each producer playing it.
In particular, we have that every producer playing 0 ∈ T constitutes a Nash equi-
librium. (We emphasize that this is by far not the only Nash equilibrium — see Theo-
rem 4.5 below.) This and other trivialities that result from domination (as well as the
domination itself) disappear in Section 4.2, when we refine the order of preferences of
the various producers. Before that, though, we continue to explore the consumer game
with coarse preferences, obtaining results that aid our analysis of the consumer game
with refined preferences in Section 4.2 below. Our next step is to not only characterize
the Nash equilibrium loads (an immediate corollary of Theorem 4.3), but furthermore,
show that every strategy profile inducing these loads is a Nash equilibrium.
THEOREM 4.4 (NASH EQUILIBRIUM LOADS). A pure-strategy profile t¯ ∈ T Pn con-
stitutes a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ,C) iff `j(t¯) = µ(T )n for every j ∈ Pn.
We proceed to directly characterize the strategies played in Nash equilibria, in a way
that does not necessitate solving the induced consumer game.
THEOREM 4.5 (NASH EQUILIBRIUM CHARACTERIZATION). Let t0 ≤ · · · ≤ tn−1 ∈
T . The pure-strategy profile t¯ , (t1, . . . , tn−1) constitutes a Nash equilibrium in
(n, µ,C) iff µ
(
[0, tj)
) ≤ jn · µ(T ) for every j ∈ Pn.
It should be emphasized that Theorem 4.5 does not imply that Nash equilibria are
interchangeable (i.e. that the set of Nash equilibria is a Cartesian product of sets of
strategies for the various producers). Consider, for example, µ = U(T ) — the uniform
measure on T . In this case, by Theorem 4.5, (0, 1n , 2n , . . . , n−1n ) is a Nash equilibrium
in (n, µ,C), and so is any permutation thereof. Nonetheless, every player playing
n−1
n ∈ T does not constitute a Nash equilibrium. We now move on to examine the
stability of the Nash equilibria in (n, µ,C) against group deviations.
The study of stability against group deviations was initiated by Aumann [1959], who
considers deviations from which all deviators gain. Recently, the CS literature consid-
ers a considerably stronger solution concept, according to which a deviation is consid-
ered beneficial even if only some of the participants in the deviating coalition gain,
as long as none of the participants lose (see e.g. [Rozenfeld and Tennenholtz 2006]).
While stability against the classical all-gaining coalitional deviation is termed strong
equilibrium, this more-demanding concept is referred to as super-strong equilibrium;
there are very few results showing its existence in nontrivial settings.
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THEOREM 4.6 (ALL NASH EQUILIBRIA ARE SUPER-STRONG). Let t¯ ∈ T Pn be a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in (n, µ,C). There exist no coalition P ⊆ Pn and strate-
gies t¯′ = (t′j)j∈P ∈ T P s.t. `j(t¯−P , t¯′) ≥ `j(t¯) for every j ∈ P , with a strict inequality for
at least one producer j ∈ P .
We conclude the static analysis of (n, µ,C) by deducing generalizations of Theo-
rems 4.3 through 4.6 for mixed-strategy profiles, as well as showing that no mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium exhibits any ex-post regret.
THEOREM 4.7 (MIXED STRATEGIES). In (n, µ,C),
(1) (DOMINANT STRATEGIES). Let p be a mixed strategy.10 p is a dominant strategy
iff µ
(
[0,Max supp(p))
)
= 0. Furthermore, each such dominant strategy guarantees a
load of at least µ(T )n with probability 1 on each producer playing it.
(2) (NASH EQUILIBRIUM LOADS). A mixed-strategy profile p¯ = (p0, . . . , pn−1)11 consti-
tutes a Nash equilibrium iff `j(p¯) = µ(T )n for every j ∈ Pn with probability 1.
(3) (NASH EQUILIBRIUM CHARACTERIZATION). A mixed-strategy profile p¯ constitutes
a Nash equilibrium iff there exists a permutation on the producers pi ∈ Pn! s.t.
µ
(
[0,Max supp(ppi(j)))
) ≤ jn · µ(T ) for every j ∈ Pn.
(4) (ALL NASH EQUILIBRIA ARE SUPER-STRONG). Let p¯ be a mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium. There exist no coalition P ⊆ Pn and mixed strategies p¯′ = (p′j)j∈P s.t.
E
[
`j(p¯−P , p¯′)
] ≥ E[`j(p¯)] for every j ∈ P , with a strict inequality for at least one
producer j ∈ P .
THEOREM 4.8 (NO EX-POST REGRET IN MIXED-STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIA).
In any mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in (n, µ,C), with probability 1 there exists no
ex-post regret for any producer. In other words, a realization of a mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium is with probability 1 a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
4.1.2. Dynamics. When analysing dynamics henceforth, we assume that µ(T ) > 0.
(Otherwise, by Theorem 4.3, all strategies are equivalent and so the analysis is trivial.)
Definition 4.9 (Schedule; Sequential/Simultaneous Schedule; Round).
(1) A schedule is a sequence (Pi)∞i=0 of nonempty subsets of Pn, s.t. j ∈ Pi for infinitely
many values of i ∈ N, for every j ∈ Pn.
(2) A schedule (Pi)∞i=0 is said to be sequential if |Pi| = 1 for every i ∈ N.
(3) A schedule (Pi)∞i=0 is said to be simultaneous if Pi = Pn for every i ∈ N.
(4) Let i1 ≤ i2 ∈ N. We say that {i ∈ N | i1 ≤ i ≤ i2} constitutes a round (in the
schedule (Pi)∞i=0) if ∪i2i=i1Pi = Pn. (We emphasize that this union need not be a
disjoint union.)
(5) Let i1 ≤ i2 ∈ N and let r ∈ N. We say that i2 is reached from i1 in r rounds if r − 1
is the largest number of pairwise-disjoint rounds into which {i1, i1 + 1, . . . , i2 − 2}
can be partitioned. (Therefore, {i1, i1 + 1, . . . , i2 − 1} cannot be partitioned into r
pairwise-disjoint rounds with a nonzero amount of “spare” trailing steps.)
Remark 4.10. In a simultaneous schedule, each step {i} constitutes a round.
Definition 4.11 (Weakly-/δ-Better-/Best-Response Dynamics; Lazy Dynamics).
(1) A weakly-better-response dynamic in (n, µ,C) is a sequence (t¯i, Pi)∞i=0, where
(Pi)
∞
i=0 is a schedule and (t¯i)∞i=0 is a sequence of strategy profiles s.t. both of the
10We consider a mixed strategy to be a random variable taking values in T .
11We emphasize that mixed-strategies of distinct producers are independent random variables.
Discussion Paper 663, Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Revised: February 11, 2015.
12 Y. A. Gonczarowski and M. Tennenholtz
following hold for every i ∈ N.
— For every j ∈ Pi, ti+1j is a weakly better response than tij to t¯i−j (by j), i.e.
`j(t¯
i
−j , t
i+1
j ) ≥ `j(t¯i).
— For every j /∈ Pi, ti+1j = tij .
By slight abuse of notation, we sometimes write (t¯i)∞i=0 to refer to (t¯i, Pi)∞i=0, when
the schedule is either inconsequential or clear from context.
(2) A weakly-better-response dynamic is said to be a best-response dynamic if for every
i ∈ N and j ∈ Pi, ti+1j is a best response to t¯i−j , i.e. ti+1j ∈ arg Maxt∈T `j(t¯i−j , t).
(3) Let δ > 0. A weakly-better-response dynamic is said to be a δ-better-response dy-
namic if for every i ∈ N and j ∈ Pi, ti+1j is either a best response to t¯i−j , or a
better response increasing j’s load by at least δ compared to tij , i.e. `j(t¯i−j , t
i+1
j ) ≥
`j(t¯
i) + δ.12
(4) A weakly-better-response dynamic is said to be lazy if for every i ∈ N and j ∈ Pi,
ti+1j = t
i
j whenever tij is a best response to t¯i−j .
Remark 4.12. In (n, µ,C),
— Every best-response dynamic is a δ-better-response dynamic, for every δ > 0.
— Every δ-better-response dynamic is also a δ′-better-response one, for every 0 < δ′ < δ.
— A weakly-better-response dynamic is a best-response dynamic iff it is a δ-better-
response dynamic for δ = µ(T ).
Remark 4.13 (A Best Response Always Exists). Let j ∈ Pn and let t¯−j ∈ T Pn\{j}. By
Theorem 4.3, a best response (by j) to t¯−j exists in (n, µ,C).
We commence with a negative result, showing that even best-response dynamics can
go out of equilibrium.
Example 4.14 (Nonsequential Nonlazy Best-Response Dynamics may Go Out of
Equilibrium). Let µ = U(T ). By Theorem 4.5, the (cyclically repeating) strategy-
profile sequence (0, 0, . . . , 0), (n−1n ,
n−1
n , . . . ,
n−1
n ), (0, 0, . . . , 0), (
n−1
n ,
n−1
n , . . . ,
n−1
n ), . . .
constitutes a (nonlazy) simultaneous best-response dynamic in (n, µ,C) that visits
nonequilibria infinitely often.
We continue by showing that the dynamic in Example 4.14 visiting Nash equilibria
infinitely often is no coincidence.
THEOREM 4.15 (δ-BETTER-RESPONSE DYNAMICS VISIT NASH EQUILIBRIA IN-
FINITELY OFTEN). Let δ > 0 and let (t¯i)∞i=0 be a δ-better-response dynamic in (n, µ,C).
t¯i is a Nash equilibrium for infinitely many values of i. Moreover, the first Nash equilib-
rium is reached (from 0) in at most n·⌈µ(T )δn ⌉ rounds, and from any later nonequilibrium,
the next Nash equilibrium is reached in at most (n− 1) · ⌈µ(T )δn ⌉ rounds.
Remark 4.16. In Theorem 4.15,
— if (t¯i)∞i=0 is simultaneous, then “rounds” may be replaced with “steps”.
— Finer analysis of similar nature may be used to show both that n · ⌈µ(T )δn ⌉ may be
replaced with
∑n
h=1
⌈µ(T )
hδn
⌉ ≈ Max{lnn · ⌈µ(T )δn ⌉, n}, and that (n − 1) · ⌈µ(T )δn ⌉ may be
replaced with
∑n
h=2
⌈µ(T )
hδn
⌉ ≈ Max{(lnn − 1) · ⌈µ(T )δn ⌉, n − 1}. We conjecture that con-
siderably tighter bounds (esp. for small δ) can be attained as well.
12Due to the continuous nature of strategies and loads, we require an improvement by at least δ, and not
just any positive improvement, in order to avoid improvements a` la Zeno’s “Race Course” paradox.
Discussion Paper 663, Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Revised: February 11, 2015.
A Mirage of Market Allocation 13
We now show that in a sense, Example 4.14 describes all the “issues” that might
prevent best- and even δ-better-response dynamics from remaining in Nash equilibria.
Remark 4.17 (Lazy Better-Response Dynamics Remain in Nash Equilibrium). Once
a lazy weakly-better-response dynamic reaches a Nash equilibrium, it remains con-
stant. (Directly by definition of Nash equilibrium and laziness.)
THEOREM 4.18 (SEQUENTIAL BETTER-RESPONSE DYNAMICS REMAIN IN NASH
EQUILIBRIA). Let (Pi)∞i=0 be a schedule. If (Pi)∞i=0 is sequential from some point, then
once a (Pi)∞i=0-scheduled weakly-better-response dynamic in (n, µ,C) reaches a Nash
equilibrium after that point, it never visits a nonequilibrium afterward.
COROLLARY 4.19 (SEQUENTIAL/LAZY δ-BETTER-RESPONSE DYNAMICS REACH
NASH EQUILIBRIA AND REMAIN). For every δ > 0, every sequential or lazy δ-better-
response dynamic in (n, µ,C) reaches a Nash equilibrium in a finite number of steps,
and never visits a nonequilibrium after that point.
PROPOSITION 4.20 (EVERY NONSEQUENTIAL SCHEDULE AND INITIAL PROFILE
HAVE NONLAZY BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS THAT GO OUT OF EQUILIBRIUM). If µ
has no atom measuring n−1n · µ(T ) or more and no tail of (Pi)∞i=0 is sequential, then for
every pure-strategy profile t¯0 there exists a nonlazy best-response dynamic in (n, µ,C)
that is scheduled by (Pi)∞i=0, starts at t¯0 and visits nonequilibria infinitely often.
Remark 4.21. Analogues of Remark 4.17, Theorem 4.18, and Proposition 4.20 hold
for mixed-strategy dynamics as well.
As every best-response dynamic is a δ-better-response one for δ = µ(T ), we con-
clude from Theorem 4.15 that such a dynamic reaches a Nash equilibrium in at most
n · ⌈ µ(T )µ(T )n⌉ = n rounds and afterward always “re-reaches” a Nash equilibrium in at
most (n− 1) · ⌈ µ(T )µ(T )n⌉ = n− 1 rounds. By applying some finer analysis, we can slightly
improve this bound, and show that the new bound is tight.
THEOREM 4.22 (BEST-RESPONSE TIME-TO-EQUILIBRIUM AND TIME BETWEEN
EQUILIBRIA). Every best-response dynamic in (n, µ,C) reaches a Nash equilibrium
in at most n− 1 rounds. Furthermore, if n > 2, then from any later nonequilibrium, the
next Nash equilibrium is reached in at most n− 2 rounds.
Remark 4.23. In Theorem 4.22, as in Theorem 4.15, if the dynamic in question is
simultaneous, then “rounds” may be replaced with “steps”.
Example 4.24 (Tightness of Theorem 4.22). Let µ = U(T ). The following is a
(nonlazy) simultaneous best-response dynamic in (n, µ,C), in which i) no two
consecutive strategy profiles are both Nash equilibria, ii) the first Nash equilib-
rium is reached in precisely n − 1 rounds (steps), and iii) from any nonequilibrium
that follows a Nash equilibrium, the next Nash equilibrium is reached in precisely
n − 2 rounds (steps): (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0), (n−1n , n−2n−1 , 0, 0, . . . , 0), (n−2n , n−2n , n−3n−1 , 0, 0, . . . , 0),
. . . , ( 3n ,
3
n , . . . ,
3
n ,
2
n−1 , 0, 0), (
2
n ,
2
n , . . . ,
2
n ,
1
n−1 , 0), (
1
n ,
1
n , . . . ,
1
n , 0) (first Nash equilibrium),
(n−1n ,
n−2
n−1 , 0, 0, . . . , 0), (
n−2
n ,
n−2
n ,
n−3
n−1 , 0, 0, . . . , 0), . . . (cyclically repeating).
To summarize Theorems 4.18 and 4.22, Example 4.24, and Remark 4.17:
COROLLARY 4.25 (SEQUENTIAL/LAZY BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS REACH NASH
EQUILIBRIA FAST AND REMAIN). Every sequential or lazy best-response dynamic in
(n, µ,C) reaches a Nash equilibrium in at most a tight bound of n − 1 rounds, and
never visits a nonequilibrium after that point.
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4.2. Fine Preferences
Definition 4.26 (Producer Game with Fine Preferences). We define the producer
game with fine preferences (n, µ,F ) as the n-player game, with set of players (called
producers) Pn, in which the pure-strategy space available to each producer is T , and
in which for each pure-strategy profile t¯ ∈ T Pn , the utility for each producer j ∈ Pn
is strictly increasing in `j(t¯) (as defined in Definition 3.13), with tie breaking (i.e. in-
finitesimal improvement) in favour of larger values of tj over smaller ones.
4.2.1. Static Analysis. We define safe alternatives and dominant strategies in (n, µ,F )
as in Definition 4.2, only w.r.t. fine preferences. The following proposition shows that
the tie-breaking refinement of the producers’ preferences into “fine preferences” indeed
successfully removes the triviality captured by Theorem 4.3, in a strong sense.
PROPOSITION 4.27 ((NO) DOMINANT AND (FEW) DOMINATED STRATEGIES). If µ
has no atom measuring n−1n · µ(T ) or more,13 then no strategies are dominant in
(n, µ,F ). Moreover, at least n−1n of the strategies in T (as measured by µ) have no
safe alternatives (other than themselves).
We now formally conclude the results captured informally in Theorem 1.2:
THEOREM 4.28 (∃! NASH EQUILIBRIUM, AND IT IS SUPER-STRONG14). A unique
(up to permutations) pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists in (n, µ,F ). The sorted
Nash-equilibrium strategies t0 ≤ · · · ≤ tn−1 ∈ T are tj , Max
{
t ∈ T | µ([0, t)) ≤
j
n · µ(T )
}
for every j ∈ Pn. The load on each producer in this equilibrium is µ(T )n .
Furthermore, this equilibrium is super-strong.
COROLLARY 4.29 (NASH EQUILIBRIUM CHARACTERIZATION — SPECIAL CASE).
If the CDF of µ is continuous (i.e. µ is atomless) and strictly increasing, then for every
j ∈ Pn, the jth sorted Nash-equilibrium strategy, tj , is the unique strategy satisfying
µ
(
[0, tj)
)
= jn · µ(T ).
PROPOSITION 4.30 (NASH EQUILIBRIA ARE IN PURE STRATEGIES). Every mixed-
strategy Nash equilibria in (n, µ,F ) is in fact in pure strategies (and is thus given by
Theorem 4.28/Corollary 4.29).
If µ is atomless, then in the Nash equilibrium defined in Theorem 4.28 and Corol-
lary 4.29, almost all (i.e. except for maybe an amount of measure zero) of the 1/n of con-
sumers (as measured by µ) with numerically smallest types consume from producer 0,
whose chosen strategy is the numerically largest one that accommodates almost all
of this 1/n; almost all of the next 1/n of consumers consume from producer 1, whose
chosen strategy is the numerically largest one that accommodates almost all of this
1/n, and so forth. Essentially, the market is split between the various producers based
on consumer types, and each producer chooses the numerically largest strategy that
accommodates almost all of its slice of the market, seemingly making no attempt to at-
tract any other consumers. We conclude the static analysis of (n, µ,F ) by formalizing
these results.
THEOREM 4.31 (MARKET SPLIT). Let t0 ≤ · · · ≤ tn−1 ∈ T s.t. t¯ constitutes a Nash
equilibrium in (n, µ,F ), and let s be a mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium in the
13The triviality in case of a very large atom should be compared to the triviality captured under the ex-
act condition in Proposition 4.20. Indeed, both trivialities are possible exactly iff there exists t ∈ T s.t.
µ
(
[0, t)
)
= 0 and µ
(
[t′, 1]
)
<
µ(T )
n
for every t′ > t.
14See Theorem 4.6 in Section 4.1 above, as well as the preceding discussion, for the definition of super-strong
equilibrium, as well as a discussion regarding various group-deviation concepts.
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induced consumer game (µ; t¯). If µ is atomless, then for every j ∈ Pn, sj(d) = 1 for
almost all (w.r.t. µ) consumer types d ∈ T s.t. µ([0, d)) ∈ ( jn · µ(T ), j+1n · µ(T )).
Remark 4.32 (Prima Facie Market Allocation). By Theorem 4.28, if µ is atomless,
then the jth sorted Nash-equilibrium strategy, tj , is the numerically largest strategy
(i.e. worst QoS) acceptable by almost all consumer types d ∈ T s.t. µ([0, d)) ∈ ( jn ·
µ(T ), j+1n · µ(T )
)
.
4.2.2. Dynamics. We define weakly-/δ-better/best-response dynamics in (n, µ,F ) as in
Definition 4.11, only with best responses defined w.r.t. fine preferences. In particular,
the definition of improvement by at least δ remains unchanged (i.e. it is defined solely
w.r.t. the load). The analogue of the last part of Remark 4.12 is therefore:
Remark 4.33. In (n, µ,F ), a weakly-better-response dynamic is a best-response dy-
namic iff it is a δ-better-response dynamic for some (equivalently, for all) δ > µ(T ).
We start by noting that best responses always exist — an observation that for gen-
eral µ is considerably less trivial w.r.t. fine preferences than w.r.t. coarse ones.
PROPOSITION 4.34 (A UNIQUE BEST RESPONSE ALWAYS EXISTS). Let j ∈ Pn and
let t¯−j ∈ T Pn\{j}. A unique best response (by j) to t¯−j exists in (n, µ,F ).
We give two proofs for Proposition 4.34: the first — quite-concise, and the second,
while requiring more involved arguments, is constructive in the sense that in contrast
to the first, it presents the best response in the form Max{t ∈ T | µ([0, t)) ≤ m}, for m
that can be explicitly calculated.
As in (n, µ,F ) no producer is ever indifferent between two strategies, all weakly-
better-response dynamics in this game are lazy; therefore, if such a dynamic reaches
a Nash equilibrium, it remains constant from that point on. We also note that Exam-
ple 4.14 is also an example of a lazy best-response dynamic in (n, µ,F ) that never
reaches a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, as best responses in (n, µ,F ) are unique, and
as the strategies in each Nash equilibrium are distinct if µ is atomless, we have that no
simultaneous best-response dynamic starting from a strategy profile with two or more
identical strategies ever reaches a Nash equilibrium. It should be noted that this is
not a boundary phenomenon; for example, if µ
(
[0, t0j )
)
> 0 for all j ∈ Pn, then the best
responses of all producers are identical (see Corollary A.29 in Appendix A.4). Many
more such examples may be constructed. We now show that these phenomena are all
avoided by sequential dynamics.
COROLLARY 4.35. Theorems 4.15 and 4.22 hold also regarding reaching a Nash
equilibrium w.r.t. (n, µ,C) by dynamics in the game (n, µ,F ).
THEOREM 4.36 (SEQUENTIAL δ-BETTER-RESPONSE DYNAMICS CONVERGE FROM
COARSE-PREFERENCES NASH EQUILIBRIUM). If (Pi)∞i=0 is sequential from some
point, then for every δ > 0, at most one round after a δ-better-response dynamic in
(n, µ,F ) reaches a Nash equilibrium w.r.t. (n, µ,C) after that point, it reaches a Nash
equilibrium w.r.t. (n, µ,F ), and remains constant from that point onward.
We hence formally conclude the results captured informally in Theorem 1.3:
COROLLARY 4.37 (SEQUENTIAL δ-BETTER-RESPONSE DYNAMICS CONVERGE).
For every δ > 0, every sequential δ-better-response dynamic in (n, µ,F ) reaches a Nash
equilibrium in a finite number of steps, and remains constant from that point onward.
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COROLLARY 4.38 (SEQUENTIAL BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS CONVERGE FAST).
Every sequential or lazy best-response dynamic in (n, µ,F ) reaches a Nash equilibrium
in at most n rounds, and never visits a nonequilibrium after that point.
We conjecture than an even-tighter bound on convergence time than in Corollar-
ies 4.35 and 4.38 is attainable. Corollaries 4.37 and 4.38 show that the prima facie
market allocation (collusive split of the market) among the various producers shown in
Theorem 4.31 and Remark 4.32 to be exhibited in every Nash equilibrium in (n, µ,F )
arises as the unique possible outcome, not as a result of anticompetitive practices,
but rather as a result of noncooperative dynamics, each producer only looking to my-
opically maximize its preferences at every step; as the best response to any strategy
profile is unique, no signalling or any other collusive or cooperative “trick” whatsoever
is used in order to reach and maintain this market split.
5. HETEROGENEOUS PRODUCTS
We have so far (in Sections 3 and 4) assumed that each consumer wishes to consume
from a producer with least load. More generally, however, as in the introduction, we
may imagine that some ISPs have different total bandwidth than others, while some
other ISPs may purchase more total bandwidth as their subscriber pool grows. In such
a scenario, in order to surf with greatest speed, each consumer would no longer like
to consume from a producer with least `j (i.e. with as few subscribers as possible), but
would rather consume from a producer with least fj(`j), where fj is an increasing con-
tinuous function for every j ∈ Pn, possibly differing between producers (e.g. `j/bj, where
bj is the total bandwidth of ISP j). The results of Sections 3 and 4 lend to generalization
also to such a scenario via similar methods, with only quantitative rather than quali-
tative changes (the results regarding δ-better-response dynamics require also that the
functions fj be Lipschitz); notably, the unique market-share division in both fine- and
coarse-preferences Nash equilibria among producers is generally no longer of 1/n of the
market to each of the producers. E.g. Theorems 4.3 through 4.5 thus become:
THEOREM 5.1 (HETEROGENEOUS PRODUCTS — COARSE PREFERENCES). There
exist amounts ˜`0, ˜`1 . . . , ˜`n−1 ∈
[
0, µ(T )] (for homogeneous products, ˜`j = µ(T )n for every
j ∈ Pn), s.t. all of the following hold.
(1) (DOMINANT STRATEGIES). Each dominant strategy in (n, µ,C) (the characteriza-
tion of such strategies is unchanged from that given in the first part of Theorem 4.3),
when played by a producer j ∈ Pn, guarantees a load of at least ˜`j on this producer.
(2) (NASH EQUILIBRIUM LOADS). A pure-strategy profile t¯ ∈ T Pn constitutes a Nash
equilibrium in (n, µ,C) iff `j(t¯) = ˜`j for every j ∈ Pn.
(3) (NASH EQUILIBRIUM CHARACTERIZATION). Let t¯ be a pure-strategy profile and
let pi ∈ Pn! be a permutation s.t. tpi(0) ≤ tpi(1) ≤ · · · ≤ tpi(n−1). t¯ constitutes a Nash
equilibrium in (n, µ,C) iff µ
(
[0, tpi(j))
) ≤∑j−1k=0 ˜`pi(k) for every j ∈ Pn.
Consequently, Theorem 4.28 and Corollary 4.29 become:
THEOREM 5.2 (HETEROGENEOUS PRODUCTS — FINE PREFERENCES).
(1) (∃! NASH EQUILIBRIUM, AND IT IS SUPER-STRONG). Let pi ∈ Pn! be a permutation
s.t. there do not exist j < k ∈ Pn s.t. ˜`pi(j) = 0 while ˜`pi(k) 6= 0. A unique pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium s.t. tpi(0) ≤ · · · ≤ tpi(n−1) exists in (n, µ,F ). The strategies of this
equilibrium are given by tpi(j) , Max
{
t ∈ T | µ([0, t)) ≤∑j−1k=0 ˜`pi(k)} for every j ∈ Pn.
The load on each producer j ∈ Pn in this Nash equilibrium is ˜`j . Furthermore, this
equilibrium is super-strong. No other Nash equilibria exist in (n, µ,F ).
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Fig. 2. A system of 5 one-way communicating vessels, corresponding to 5 heterogeneous ISPs (see the in-
troduction) with the following characteristics, from left to right (i.e. from lowest latency/best QoS to highest
latency/worst QoS): A “normal” ISP, an ISP with half the total bandwidth of a “normal” one, an ISP whose to-
tal bandwidth somewhat increases with its number of subscribers, an ISP whose total bandwidth somewhat
decreases with its number of subscribers, and a “normal” ISP who buys additional bandwidth if needed, so
that the bandwidth for a single subscriber never drops below some threshold. (After the surface of the liquid
in the fifth vessel reaches the tube connecting this vessel to the container on its right, which we consider
as part of the fifth vessel, any additional liquid poured into this vessel accumulates in the container on the
right; assume that this container is large enough so as to never fill up.) We emphasize that the technical
modifications to Lemma A.2 to accommodate any collection of increasing continuous functions (fj)j∈Pn are
straightforward and do not require defining any shapes for any vessels — this is done purely to convey in-
tuition. (We require that the functions be strictly increasing for simplicity, however these results still hold
if one of them is merely nondecreasing, e.g. as in the scenario depicted in the figure; however, if more than
one of these functions is not strictly increasing, e.g. if a sixth vessel identical to the fifth one is added in this
figure, then Theorem 3.11 may no longer hold.) The producer-equilibrium loads ˜`0, . . . , ˜`n−1 can be found by
pouring the entire µ(T ) of liquid into the rightmost vessel (i.e. computing the loads when each producer j’s
strategy is the ˜`j -guaranteeing strategy 0 ∈ T ), or, equivalently, by simply removing the one-way valves (i.e.
permitting liquid flow in both directions) and pouring µ(T ) liquid into the system (observe that either way,
if all vessels are of the same shape, then we indeed obtain ˜`j =
µ(T )
n
for every j ∈ Pn, as in Section 4); a
similar “two-way” calculation among subsets of vessels generalizes Algorithm 1 to this scenario.
(2) (NASH EQUILIBRIUM CHARACTERIZATION — SPECIAL CASE). If the CDF of µ is
continuous (i.e. µ is atomless) and strictly increasing, then for every j ∈ Pn, in the
Nash equilibrium corresponding to a permutation pi ∈ Pn! with the above properties,
tpi(j) is the unique strategy satisfying µ
(
[0, tpi(j))
)
=
∑j−1
k=0
˜`
pi(k).
The remainder of the results of Sections 3 and 4, including those regarding dynam-
ics, readily generalize to this scenario as well. So, we once again have that in a Nash
equilibrium in (n, µ,F ), the market is split between producers based on consumer
types; if µ is atomless and tpi(0) ≤ · · · ≤ tpi(n−1), then almost all of the ˜`pi(0) consumers
with numerically smallest types consume from producer pi(0) (who chooses the largest
strategy acceptable by almost all of them, seemingly making no attempt to attract any
other consumers), almost all of the next ˜`pi(1) consumers consume from producer pi(1)
(who chooses the largest strategy acceptable by almost all of them, seemingly making
no attempt to attract any others), and so forth. See Fig. 2 for an illustration regard-
ing the adaptation of the results from Section 3 to this generalized model, and the
calculation of ˜`0, . . . , ˜`n−1.15
6. MULTIPLE PRODUCTS AND THE FORMATION OF MAIN STREET
We conclude the body of this paper with an aesthetically appealing corollary, obtained
by extending our model to allow for multiple good types. (While we restrict ourselves
in this section to the case of two good types, the results below readily generalize also
15See Gonczarowski and Tennenholtz [2014] for a formalization, as part of (as mentioned above) a signif-
icant, highly nontrivial, generalization of our treatment of only the consumer game (without the producer
game) to arbitrary resource-selection games (in which the resources available to a player may be any subset
of Pn and not merely a “QoS-prefix” of Pn to which the above construction is inherently tailored) and beyond.
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to the case of more than two good types.) Consider the following alternative (non-ISP)
interpretation of our model.
Example 6.1 (Wine Market; QoS=Centrality of Location). Consider the downtown
area of the fictional city of Metropolis, the wine capital of the world. At its heart lies
Metropolis Central Station. Every morning, shoppers (consumers) from throughout the
Metropolis metropolitan area (and beyond) disembark the train at Metropolis Central,
at the vicinity of which many wine shops (producers) are located, and go about their
wine-shopping errands. Each shopper is interested in purchasing a single bottle of
wine, and is willing to walk at most d minutes (a shopper-dependant real value) in
each direction in order to get it. All other wine characteristics being the same, each
shopper would like the bottle of wine that she buys to be as exclusive as possible, i.e.
she prefers to get her wine at the shop that sells the fewest bottles of wine throughout
the day (so that it can be considered a “boutique wine”), as long as it is no more than
d minutes away from Metropolis Central, of course. As some wines may be known to
be of superior types, are more extravagantly packaged, or have some other attractive
quality, shoppers may be willing to compromise on “exclusivity” in favour of superior
quality. Therefore, each shopper would like to minimize a wine-seller-dependent in-
creasing function of the wine’s circulation, e.g. shoppers may wish to maximize the
quotient of quality and circulation.
Obviously, each wine seller would like to locate her store in a way that would maxi-
mize its sales volume. That being said, as real-estate prices rise the closer (in walking
time) a shop is to Metropolis Central (we think of sales as indicative of daily income,
and of real-estate cost as a one-time expense), each wine seller would like to place her
store the farthest possible from the station, as long as this does not hurt sales.
Our results from the previous sections imply that in the scenario described in Exam-
ple 6.1, the unique possible noncooperative outcome is once again for the market to be
split between the various wine sellers based on the shoppers’ types, i.e. each shopper
shopping at the store closest to Metropolis Central has a smaller walking-time limit
than any of those shopping at the store second-closest to Metropolis Central, each of
whom in turn having a smaller walking-time limit than all of those shopping at the
third-closest store, etc., and each wine seller chooses the farthest location accessible
by the entirety of its slice of the market, seemingly making no attempt to attract any
other shoppers. While this characterizes the distance of each wine shop from Metropo-
lis Central, the direction from Metropolis Central to each such shop can be arbitrary.
Not for long, though.
Suppose now that merchants from the nearby town of Smallville, the extra-extra-
extra-virgin-olive-oil capital of the world, wishing to widen the visibility of their prod-
uct, have started moving their stores to Downtown Metropolis as well. Now that
Metropolis has become both the wine- and the extra-extra-extra-virgin-olive-oil cap-
ital of the world, each shopper arriving at Metropolis Central would like to purchase
not only a bottle of wine, but also a bottle of olive oil. Nonetheless, the walking-time
limit of each shopper does not change — each shopper is still willing to walk at most 2d
minutes in order to obtain both products. (This indeed introduces no change, as each
shopper was previously willing to walk at most d minutes in each direction.) As with
wine, each shopper prefers to minimize a seller-dependent function of the circulation
of the type of olive oil that she purchases, as long as her walking-time constraint is
met. (One may again consider e.g. the case in which one would like to maximize the
quotient of quality to circulation, optimizing some form of tradeoff between quality and
“boutiqueness”.) Olive-oil merchants have preferences similar to those of wine sellers.
Formally, we have n1 ∈ N producers of the first good (e.g. wine) and n2 ∈ N producers
of the second good (e.g. olive oil). The strategy of each producer is a point on the plane;
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a pure-consumption strategy of a consumer with type d ∈ T is a pair (j, k) ∈ Pn1 ×
Pn2 , denoting consumption of the first good from producer j of this good, and of the
second good — from producer k of that good; each consumer would like to minimize
f1j (`j) + f
2
k (`k)
16 (e.g. the sum of the quotients of the quality and circulation for each
good), subject to the constraint the that circumference of the triangle, whose vertices
are the origin (Metropolis Central Station) and the locations (strategies) of producer j
of good 1 and of producer k of good 2, does not exceed 2d (the density of consumer types,
as given by µ, remains unchanged). Each producer would like to first and foremost
maximize its number of consumers, and only as a tie-breaker, maximize the norm of
its strategy (i.e. its distance from the origin).
Under these conditions, roughly speaking, each producer would like to be located so
that visiting it would never be too much of a detour on the way from the origin to a
producer of the other good. Indeed, we now show that the unique stablest outcome, in
a precise sense, is for all shops to be placed on the same ray originating at Metropolis
Central (with the distance of each store from Metropolis Central set as before, as if its
good type were the only one on the market). (See Appendix A.5 for a proof, as well as a
discussion regarding the necessity of the conditions below.)
THEOREM 6.2 (THE UNIQUE SUPER-STRONG EQUILIBRIUM IS A MAIN STREET
ORIGINATING FROM THE ORIGIN). Let ˜`10, . . . , ˜`1n1−1 be the producer-equilibrium loads
when only the first good is on the market (i.e. as defined in Section 5 when the only pro-
ducers are the n1 producers of good 1) and let ˜`20, . . . , ˜`2n2−1 be the producer-equilibrium
loads when only the second good is on the market. If no nonempty proper subset of the
former loads and no nonempty proper subset of the latter loads have the same sum, and
if ˜`gj > 0 for all g and j, then a producer strategy profile is a super-strong equilibrium
iff the strategies of all producers of both products are on the same ray from the origin,
with distances from the origin as in Theorem 5.2 (when computed separately for each
good).
While most readers are likely to consider the formation of a main street as a fairly
natural phenomenon due to its abundance in many cities, some readers may find it
somewhat less natural for this main street, as deduced in Theorem 6.2, to originate
from the city centre (e.g. Metropolis Central Station), rather than having the city cen-
tre in its middle. Such readers may compare this with the structure of many old Euro-
pean towns, at the heart of which lies the old stone-cobbled main street, on one end of
which (as opposed to at the middle of which) lies the main town church.
7. DISCUSSION
This paper shows, under quite general setting, that the appearance of collusion need
not imply the actuality. While we believe a main strength of our model to lie in its
theoretic generality and aesthetics (its novel combination of congestion and location
games, its clean results despite complex nontrivial multistage game analysis, and its
(surprising) qualitative lesson), the question of the applicability of our model to a real-
life market is a valid one. Although our work is motivated mainly by internet mon-
etization, and while we believe that its predictions will be confirmed with time, it is
hard to validate its predictions on today’s home internet market for several reasons,
the main of which being that in many countries, many customers are not yet educated
enough regarding latency, which leads ISPs to differentiate themselves from their com-
petitors using other traits. In this section, we offer real-world evidence supporting the
applicability of our model to the food market in Israel.
16This sum may be replaced with any increasing continuous function of f1j , f
2
k , e.g. their weighted average.
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The vast majority of groceries sold in Israel are Kosher. In fact, a nonnegligible part
of the Jewish population in Israel, and in particular ultra-orthodox Jews, are only
willing to buy food which is not only Kosher, but even more strictly monitored and
restricted; we henceforth refer to such food as extra-monitored. As extra-monitoring
can be certified only by a handful of third-party monitors, manufacturing the same
food product from the same ingredients costs more when it is to be labelled as extra-
monitored than when it is to be labelled as (“regular”) Kosher. Due to heavy lobbying
on behalf of ultra-orthodox groups, though, even though producing an extra-monitored
version of the same product costs more than producing a Kosher version of that prod-
uct, both versions are sold by retailers for identical prices. (This holds in particular for
products whose prices are regulated; no retailer would ever charge extra, beyond the
regulated price, as compensation for extra-monitoring.) This property of the prices,
together with the fact that a considerable amount of the population in Israel is pri-
marily concerned with the monitoring level of their groceries, makes the food market
in Israel fit squarely in our model, with retailers as providers, shoppers for “a week’s
worth of groceries” as consumers, and the monitoring level of groceries as their QoS
(there are in fact quite a few monitoring levels). Indeed, each shopper has a minimum
required level of monitoring, beyond which she or he is indifferent (as it is physically
the same product, at the exact same price), and it is quite reasonable that shoppers in
a certain neighbourhood would therefore choose the least-crowded grocery store in the
neighbourhood (no one likes to wait in line. . . ) out of those stores that meet their min-
imum required level of monitoring. From the retailers’ point of view, they would like to
first and foremost maximize their number of shoppers, and as long as this number is
not hurt, minimize the monitoring level of each of their products (the price difference
for monitoring, while nonzero, is negligible relative to capturing more market share).
Our results from the previous sections predict that under these conditions, the
unique possible noncooperative outcome is for the market to be split between the var-
ious retailers based on the shoppers’ minimum required monitoring level, i.e. each
shopper shopping at the “minimum monitoring” retailer has a lower minimum re-
quired monitoring level than any of those shopping at the “second-lowest monitoring”
retailer, each of whom in turn having a lower minimum required monitoring level than
all of those shopping at the “third-lowest monitoring” retailer, etc., and each retailer
chooses the minimum monitoring level that satisfies the entirety of its slice of the mar-
ket, seemingly making no attempt to attract any other (stricter) shoppers. Indeed, in
neighbourhoods with both nonnegligible ultra-orthodox population and nonnegligible
orthodox populations, one notices that grocery stores label themselves by their specific
monitoring level, which is applied to all products in the store. Our early study, to be
further explored in a companion work, suggests that the number of stores of each mon-
itoring level (when weighted by store size) roughly corresponds to the demand for this
monitoring level as a minimum required level.
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APPENDIX
A. PROOFS AND AUXILIARY RESULTS
A.1. Proofs and Auxiliary Results for Section 3
We commence with a few lemmas used in the proofs of Theorems 3.5 and 3.10.
LEMMA A.1 (LOAD IS NONINCREASING IN STRATEGY). Under the definitions of
Section 3, if t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tn−1, then for every mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium s
in the n-producers consumer game (µ; t¯), we have `s0 ≥ `s1 ≥ · · · ≥ `sn−1.
PROOF. Let j ∈ {0, . . . , n − 2}. If `sj+1 = 0, then `sj ≥ `sj+1. Assume, therefore, that
`sj+1 > 0. Hence, there exists d ≥ tj+1 s.t. sj+1(d) > 0. By definition of s, and as d ≥
tj+1 ≥ tj , we thus have `sj+1 ≤ `sj , as required.
As mentioned above, the construction in the proof of Theorems 3.5 and 3.10 is illus-
trated in Fig. 1. In the context of that figure, the following lemma can be thought of as
answering the following question: if the amount of liquid in each vessel j ∈ Pn is `j , by
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how much would the liquid in each vessel rise if we pour an additional amount m of
liquid into vessel n− 1? (The rise in the amount of liquid in vessel j is given by pj .)
LEMMA A.2. Let `0 ≥ `1 ≥ · · · ≥ `n−1 be a finite nonincreasing sequence in R≥. For
every m ∈ R≥, there exists p ∈ [0,m]Pn , which may be computed in O(n) time, s.t. all of
the following hold.
(1)
∑n−1
j=0 pj = m.
(2) `0 + p0 ≥ `1 + p1 ≥ · · · ≥ `n−1 + pn−1.
(3) `k + pk = minj∈Pn{`j + pj} for every k ∈ Pn s.t. pk > 0.
PROOF. We iteratively define a sequence pn ≤ pn−1 ≤ . . . ≤ p0 ∈ [0,m]Pn s.t. the
following hold for every i ∈ {0, . . . , n}.
(1) pij = 0 for every j < i.
(2)
∑n−1
j=0 p
i
j ≤ m, with equality when i = 0.
(3) There exists hi ∈ R≥ s.t. all of the following hold.
— If
∑n−1
j=0 p
i+1
j < m, then `j + p
i
j = hi for every j ≥ i,
— If
∑n−1
j=0 p
i
j < m, then `i−1 + pii−1 = hi as well.
— `j ≥ hi for every j < i.
In the setting of Fig. 1, pn describes the rise of liquid before we begin pouring the
additional amount m, while for every i ∈ Pn, pi describes the rise of liquid at the
last instant during the pouring process, in which no water has risen except in vessels
i, i + 1, . . . , n − 1. (This can be either the final rise in liquid if i = 0 or if the final rise
does not involve a change in the amount of liquid in vessels j < i, or alternatively the
rise in liquid just before the liquid in vessel i− 1 begins to rise.)
For the base case, we define pn ≡ 0, and all parts trivially hold (with hn , `n−1). For
the construction step, let i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} and assume that pi+1 has been defined. Let
c ,
∑n−1
j=0 p
i+1
j . By Property 2 for i + 1, c ≤ m. If i = 0, then we define r , m − c ≥ 0;
otherwise, we define r , min
{
(n − i) · (`i−1 − hi+1),m − c
}
, and by Property 3, r ≥ 0
in this case as well. We define pij , 0 for every j < i (and so Property 1 holds for
i), and pij , pi+1j + rn−i ≥ pi+1j for every j ≥ i. Property 2 holds for i as
∑n−1
j=0 p
i
j =∑n−1
j=0 p
i+1
j + r = c+ r ≤ m, with equality when i = 0. Finally, we show that Property 3
holds for i, with hi , hi+1 + rn−i . If
∑n−1
j=0 p
i+1
j < m, then as p
i+2 ≤ pi+1, we have that
(i + 1 = n or)
∑n−1
j=0 p
i+2
j < m as well. Therefore, by Property 3 for i + 1, we have for
every j ≥ i that `j + pij = `j + pi+1j + rn−i = hi+1 + rn−i = hi. If
∑n−1
j=0 p
i
j < m, then
r < m − c and so by definition, r = (n − i) · (`i−1 − hi+1). Therefore, hi = hi+1 + rn−i =
`i−1 = `i−1 + pii−1. Finally, for every j < i, by ` nonincreasing and by definition of r we
have `j ≥ `i−1 ≥ hi+1 + rn−i = hi, and the proof of the construction is complete.
Let ı˜ ∈ {0, . . . , n} be largest s.t. ∑n−1j=0 pı˜j = m; ı˜ is well defined by Property 2 for
i = 0. We now show that p , pı˜ meets the conditions of the lemma. By definition,∑n−1
j=0 pj = m.
Let j ∈ Pn \ {n− 1}. If j < ı˜− 1, then by Property 1 for i = ı˜, we have `j + pj = `j ≥
`j+1 = `j+1 + pj+1. If j = ı˜− 1, then by Properties 1 and 3 for i = ı˜ and by definition of
ı˜, we have `j + pj = `j = `ı˜−1 ≥ hı˜ = `ı˜ + pı˜ = `j+1 + pj+1. Otherwise, i.e. if j > ı˜ − 1,
then by Property 3 for i = ı˜ and by definition of ı˜, we have `j + pj = hı˜ = `j+1 + pj+1.
We conclude that minj∈Pn{`j + pj} = `n−1 + pn−1. For every k ∈ Pn s.t. pk > 0, by
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Property 1 for i = ı˜ we have k ≥ ı˜. Therefore, by Property 3 for i = ı˜ and by definition
of ı˜, we have `k + pk = hı˜ = `n−1 + pn−1 = minj∈Pn{`j + pj}, as required.
Finally, although it may seem in first glance that O(n2) time may be required to
compute p, we note that the sequence (hi)ni=0 can be computed in O(n) time, that from
this sequence ı˜ can be deduced in O(n) time as the largest s.t. hı˜ = h0, and that from
both, p can be calculated in O(n) time: pj = 0 for j < ı˜ by Property 1 for i = ı˜, while
pj = hı˜ − `j for j ≥ ı˜ by Property 3 for i = ı˜.
We now prove Theorem 3.10, and then deduce Theorem 3.5 therefrom. Alternatively,
Theorem 3.5 can also be proven directly from Lemma A.2, similarly to the proof of
Theorem 3.10.
Definition A.3. For a finite measure µ on T and a measurable set E ⊆ T , we denote
by µ|∩E the finite measure on T given by µ|∩E(A) , µ(A ∩ E).
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.10. We prove the claim by induction on n. (Recall that the
construction underlying this proof is illustrated by Fig. 1; also recall the explanation
preceding the statement of Lemma A.2 regarding the meaning of that lemma in the
context of that figure.)
Base (n = 0): In this case, S = {¬}, and so s ≡ 1{¬} is a Nash equilibrium as required.
Step (n > 0): Assume w.l.o.g. that t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tn−1. By the induction hypothe-
sis, there exists a symmetric mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium s′ in the (n − 1)-
producers consumer game (µ|∩[0,tn−1); t0, . . . , tn−2). If µ
(
[tn−1, 1]
)
= 0, then we define a
mixed-consumption profile s in (µ; t¯) s.t. s|[0,tn−1) = s′[0,tn−1), and s|[tn−1,1] ≡ 1{n−1}. As
s′ is symmetric in (µ|∩[0,tn−1); t0, . . . , tn−2), so is s in (µ; t¯). As `sj = `s
′
j for every j ∈ Pn−1,
by s′ being a Nash equilibrium in (µ|∩[0,tn−1); t0, . . . , tn−2) we have that no player of any
type d ∈ [0, tn−1) has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from s. As µ
(
[tn−1, 1]
)
= 0,
we have `sn−1 = 0, and so players of types d ∈ [tn−1, 1] have no incentive to deviate from
s either. Therefore, s is a symmetric Nash equilibrium as required, and the proof for
this case is complete. Assume therefore, henceforth, that µ
(
[tn−1, 1]
)
> 0.
Recall that `s
′
0 , `
s′
1 , . . . , `
s′
n−2 are the loads on producers in s′, and by slight abuse of
notation, define `s
′
n−1 , 0 ≤ `s
′
n−2; by Lemma A.1, `s
′
0 ≥ `s
′
1 ≥ · · · ≥ `s
′
n−2 ≥ `s
′
n−1. Let
p be as in Lemma A.2 for `j = `s
′
j for every j ∈ Pn, and for m = µ
(
[tn−1, 1]
)
> 0. We
define a mixed-consumption profile s in (µ; t¯) s.t. s|[0,tn−1) = s′|[0,tn−1), and s|[tn−1,1] ≡
p
µ([tn−1,1])
(by Lemma A.2(1), indeed pµ([tn−1,1]) ∈ ∆Sd for all d ≥ tn−1). Once again, as
s′ is symmetric, so is s. It remains to show that s is indeed a Nash equilibrium as
required.
By definition of s′ and of s, we have that `sj = `s
′
j +pj for every j ∈ Pn. Let d ∈ [0, tn−1).
As `s
′
0 , . . . , `
s′
n−2 and `s0, . . . , `sn−2 are both nonincreasing (the former by Lemma A.1, and
the latter — by Lemma A.2(2)), and as Sd is the same in both (µ|∩[0,tn−1); t0, . . . , tn−2)
and (µ; t¯), we have that as no player of type d has any incentive to unilaterally deviate
from s′ in the former, neither does it from s in the latter. Let now d ∈ [tn−1, 1]. For every
k ∈ supp(s(d)), we have by definition pk > 0, and so, by Lemma A.2(3), `sk = minj∈Pn `sj ,
and the proof is complete.
The complexity claim follows as each inductive step requires O(n) time — the time
required to calculate p, by Lemma A.2.
COROLLARY A.4. Let h ∈ Pn, let s′ be a mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium in the
h-producers consumer game (µ|∩[0,th); t0, . . . , th−1), and let s be the mixed-consumption
Nash equilibrium in the n-producers consumer game (µ; t¯) constructed iteratively from
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s′ as in the proof of Theorem 3.10. For every 0 ≤ j < h, we have `sj ≥ `s
′
j , with equality if
`sh−1 > `
s
h.
PROOF. By following the construction in the proof of Theorem 3.10, and by
Lemma A.2(3).
Theorem 3.5 follows from Theorem 3.10 and from the following lemma.
LEMMA A.5 (THEOREM 3.10⇒ THEOREM 3.5). If a mixed-consumption Nash equi-
librium exists in the n-producers consumer game (µ; t¯), and if µ is atomless, then a
pure-consumption Nash equilibrium exists in this game as well.
PROOF. Assume w.l.o.g. that t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tn−1. Let s be a mixed-consumption
Nash equilibrium in the game (µ; t¯). For every i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 2}, set Ci , [ti, ti+1), and
set C¬ , [0, t0) and Cn−1 , [tn−1, 1]; note that Sd = {¬} for all d ∈ C¬, and that Sd =
{0, . . . , i} ∪ {¬} for all d ∈ Ci, for every i ∈ Pn. For every i, j ∈ S, define pij ,
∫
Ci
sj dµ;
note that if pij > 0, then sj(d) > 0 for some d ∈ Ci. Let i ∈ S. We first consider the
case in which either µ(Ci) > 0 or Ci = ∅. In this case, as µ is atomless, there exists
a partition of Ci into n pairwise-disjoint measurable sets (Cij)j∈S , s.t. µ(Cij) = pij for
all j ∈ S, and s.t. Cij = ∅ whenever pij = 0. Otherwise, i.e. if µ(Ci) = 0 yet Ci 6= ∅,
then let k ∈ S s.t. sk(d) > 0 for some d ∈ Ci, and define Cik , Ci, and Cij , ∅ for every
j ∈ S \ {k}. Note that in this case we also have that (Cij)j∈S is a partition of Ci and
µ(Cij) = 0 =
∫
Ci
sj dµ = p
i
j for all j ∈ S.
We define a measurable function s′ : T → S by s′|∪i∈SCij ≡ j for every j ∈ S. For
every j ∈ S, we note that `s′j = µ(∪i∈SCij) =
∑
i∈S p
i
j =
∑
i∈S
∫
Ci
sj dµ =
∫
T sj dµ = `
s
j .
We conclude by showing that s′ is indeed a pure-strategy profile, and moreover —
a Nash equilibrium. Let d ∈ T ; by definition there exists i ∈ S s.t. d ∈ Cis′(d) ⊆ Ci.
As Cis′(d) 6= ∅, by definition of Cis′(d) we have that ss′(d)(d′) > 0 for some d′ ∈ Ci, and
so s′(d) ∈ Sd′ . As by definition of Ci we have Sd = Sd′ , we obtain s′(d) ∈ Sd, and so
s′ is a pure-strategy profile. Furthermore, as ss′(d)(d′) > 0, we obtain `s
′
s′(d) = `
s
s′(d) =
minj∈Sd′ `
s
j = minj∈Sd `
s
j = minj∈Sd `
s′
j , and the proof is complete.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.11. Assume w.l.o.g. that t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tn−1. Let s, s′ be
two mixed-consumption Nash equilibria in the game (µ; t¯). By definition of Nash equi-
librium, we have s′¬ = 1[0,t0) = s¬, and so
∑n−1
j=0 `
s′
j = µ
(
[t0, 1]
)
=
∑n−1
j=0 `
s
j . Assume for
contradiction that there exists j ∈ Pn s.t. `s′j 6= `sj ; let j be minimal with this property,
and assume w.l.o.g. that `s
′
j > `
s
j .
Let j ≤ k < n be maximal s.t. `s′k = `s
′
j . By Lemma A.1, for every j ≤ i ≤ k, we have
`s
′
i = `
s′
j > `
s
j ≥ `si . Therefore, and as `s
′
i = `
s
i for every 0 ≤ i < j, we have
∑k
j=0 `
s′
j >∑k
j=0 `
s
j . We thus obtain both that k < n−1, and that
∑k
j=0 `
s′
j >
∑k
j=0 `
s
j ≥ µ
(
[t0, tk+1)
)
.
Therefore,
∑n−1
j=k+1 `
s′
j < µ
(
[tk+1, 1]
)
, and hence there exists d ∈ [tk+1, 1] s.t. s′i(d) > 0 for
some 0 ≤ i ≤ k. As by Lemma A.1 we have `s′i ≥ `s
′
k > `
s′
k+1, we conclude that s
′ is not a
Nash equilibrium — a contradiction.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 3.12. Assume w.l.o.g. that t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tn−1. Let s
be a mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium in the game (µ; t¯), let d ∈ T and let
k ∈ supp(s(d)). If d < tj for all j ∈ Pn, then k = ¬ and so `sk = µ([0, t0)). Other-
wise, k 6= ¬ and so d ≥ t0; let i ∈ Pn be largest s.t. ti ≤ d. By definition of s and by
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Lemma A.1, we have `sk = min{`sj | tj ≤ d} = `si . Either way (and by Theorem 3.11
when k 6= ¬), `sk does not depend on the choice of s, as required.
From Algorithm 1, we obtain the following recursive identity for `k(t¯).
COROLLARY A.6. If t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tn−1, then defining tn , 2, we have
`k(t0, . . . , tn−1) = Max
k<j≤n
µ
(
[t0, tj)
)−∑k−1i=0 `i(t¯)
j − h = Maxk<j≤n
µ
(
[0, tj)
)−∑i∈Pk∪{¬} `i(t¯)
j − h
(where by slight abuse of notation, µ is treated as a measure on [0, 2] with support T )
for every k ∈ Pn.
PROOF. A direct corollary of Algorithm 1, by considering two cases: in the first,
either k = 0 or `k(t¯) < `k−1(t¯) (and so the given value k is the value of the variable
k in some iteration of Algorithm 1); in the second, k > 0 and `k(t¯) = `k−1(t¯) (and so
Algorithm 1 calculates both `k(t¯) and `k−1(t¯) in the same iteration of the while loop,
and therefore they are identical; it is straightforward to verify that the expression in
the statement evaluates to the same value for both k − 1 and k in this case).
A.2. Analysis of `
Before moving on to prove the results presented in Section 4, we now formalize three
analytic properties of the function ` (defined in Definition 3.13), which we later utilize
when proving the results of Section 4. The first property is that the load on a producer
does not decrease if the producer raises the offered quality of service (i.e. lowers its
strategy).
LEMMA A.7 (`j IS NONINCREASING IN tj). For every j ∈ Pn and for every t¯ ∈ T Pn
and t′j ∈ T , if tj < t′j , then `j(t¯−j , t′j) ≤ `j(t¯).
PROOF. Let t¯ ∈ T Pn , k ∈ Pn and t′k ∈ (tk, 1]. Assume w.l.o.g. that t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤
tn−1 ∈ T . If k 6= n − 1, then it is enough to consider the case tk < t′k ≤ tk+1. Let s be a
mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium in the induced consumer game (µ; t¯). For every
j ∈ Pn \ {k}, define t′j , tj . Let s′ be a mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium in (µ; t¯′),
and assume for contradiction that `s
′
k > `
s
k. Let i ∈ Pn be maximal s.t. `s
′
i = `
s′
k ; by
definition, i ≥ k.
We claim that `s
′
j ≥ `sj for every 0 ≤ j ≤ i. Let 0 ≤ h ≤ i be minimal s.t. `sh ≤ `s
′
k
(such h exists, and h ≤ k, as `sk < `s
′
k ); we will show that `
s′
j ≥ `sj separately for every
0 ≤ j < h (if h > 0) and for every h ≤ j ≤ i. For every h ≤ j ≤ i, by Lemma A.1, by
definition of i and by definition of h, we have `s
′
j ≥ `s
′
i = `
s′
k ≥ `sh ≥ `sj , as required. We
move on to show that `s
′
j ≥ `sj for every 0 ≤ j < h; assume that h > 0 (otherwise, there
is nothing to show). Let ˜`0, . . . , ˜`h−1 be the loads on producers 0, . . . , h − 1 in a Nash
equilibrium in the game (µ|∩[0,th); t0, . . . , th−1); similarly, let ˜`′0, . . . , ˜`′h−1 be the loads on
producers 0, . . . , h−1 in a Nash equilibrium in the game (µ|∩[0,t′h); t′0, . . . , t′h−1). As h > 0,
by definition of h we have `sh−1 > `
s
h; therefore, by Corollary A.4 and Theorem 3.11,
we have that `sj = ˜`j for every 0 ≤ j < h. By Corollary A.4 and Theorem 3.11, we
obtain also that `s
′
j ≥ ˜`′j for every 0 ≤ j < h. As k ≥ h, we have that t′j = tj for
every 0 ≤ j < h and that t′h−1 ≥ th−1; therefore, ˜`′j ≥ ˜`j for every 0 ≤ j < h. (This
follows by by tracing the construction in the proof of Theorem 3.10, as all inductive
steps but the last are identical, while the last, examining Lemma A.2, increases each
load by no less when computing ˜`′ than when computing ˜`; in the context of Fig. 1,
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pouring a additional nonnegative amount of liquid into the rightmost vessel does not
cause the liquid level in any vessel to fall. Alternatively, this can also be seen by tracing
Algorithm 1, as each iteration when computing ˜`′ either computes the same load values
for the producers as the corresponding iteration when computing ˜`, or is the last, thus
computing loads that are not lower than those computed for ˜`.) Combining all of these,
we have `s
′
j ≥ ˜`′j ≥ ˜`j = `sj for every 0 ≤ j < h, as required.
We conclude that
∑i
j=0 `
s′
j >
∑i
j=0 `
s
j , as `s
′
j ≥ `sj for every 0 ≤ j ≤ i, with a strict
inequality for j = k. If i = n − 1, then ∑n−1j=0 `s′j > ∑n−1j=0 `sj = µ([t0, 1]) ≥ µ([t′0, 1])
— a contradiction; assume, therefore, that i < n − 1. Hence, ∑ij=0 `s′j > ∑ij=0 `sj ≥
µ
(
[t0, ti+1)
) ≥ µ([t′0, ti+1)). Therefore, there exists d ≥ t′i+1 s.t. s′j(d) > 0 for some 0 ≤
j ≤ i, but by Lemma A.1 and by definition of i we notice that `s′j ≥ `s
′
i > `
s′
i+1, so s′ is
not a Nash equilibrium in (µ; t¯′) — a contradiction as well.
We note that an alternative proof may also be given via Algorithm 1 and Corol-
lary A.6.
The second property is that the load on producer j cannot increase as a result of
other producers moving closer to j’s quality of service.
LEMMA A.8 (`j IS WEAKLY QUASICONVEX IN tk). For every j ∈ Pn ∪ {¬} and j 6=
k ∈ Pn and for every t¯ ∈ T Pn and t′k ∈ T , if j 6= ¬ and either tk < t′k ≤ tj or tj ≤ t′k < tk,
or if j = ¬ and t′k < tk, then `j(t¯−k, t′k) ≤ `j(t¯).
PROOF. Assume w.l.o.g. that t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tn−1. If k 6= n − 1, then it is enough to
consider the case tk < t′k ≤ tk+1. Let s and s′ be mixed-consumption Nash equilibria in
(µ; t¯) and (µ; t¯−k, t′k), respectively.
Assume for contradiction that `s
′
i > `
s
i for some k < i < n, and let i be minimal with
this property. Therefore (and by Lemma A.7 if i = k + 1), `s
′
i−1 ≤ `si−1. By Lemma A.1,
we obtain `si−1 ≥ `s
′
i−1 ≥ `s
′
i > `
s
i . Therefore, sj |[ti,1] ≡ 0 for every 0 ≤ j < i, and
so
∑n−1
j=i `
s′
j ≤ µ
(
[ti, 1]) =
∑n−1
j=i `
s
j . Hence, and as `s
′
i > `
s
i , there exists i < h < n
s.t. `s
′
h < `
s
h — let h be minimal with this property. Therefore, `
s′
h−1 ≥ `sh−1, and by
Lemma A.1, we obtain `s
′
h−1 ≥ `sh−1 ≥ `sh > `s
′
h . By definition of h, we have that `
s′
j ≥ `sj
for every i ≤ j < h, with a strict inequality for j = i by definition of i, and so∑h−1j=i `s′j >∑h−1
j=i `
s
j ≥ µ
(
[ti, th)
)
, with the last inequality since sj |[ti,1] ≡ 0 for every 0 ≤ j < i.
Therefore, there exists d ≥ th s.t. s′j(d) > 0 for some i ≤ j < h, but by Lemma A.1,
`s
′
j ≥ `s
′
h−1 > `
s′
h , so s
′ is not a Nash equilibrium in (µ; t¯−k, t′k) — a contradiction.
Assume now for contradiction that `s
′
i < `
s
i for some 0 ≤ i < k, and let i be minimal
with this property. As k > 0, we have `s¬ = µ
(
[0, t0)
)
= `s
′
¬ . Therefore,
∑n−1
j=0 `
s′
j =∑n−1
j=0 `
s
j and by definition of i there exists h ∈ Pn s.t. `s
′
h > `
s
h — let h be minimal
with this property. By Lemma A.7 and by the first part of this proof, h < k. We now
consider two cases: h < i and i < h. We start with the case h < i. In this case, by
definition of i and by Lemma A.1, `s
′
i−1 ≥ `si−1 ≥ `si > `s
′
i , and so, by Corollary A.4 and
as i < k, `s
′
h = `h(µ|∩[0,ti); t0, . . . , ti−1) ≤ `sh — a contradiction. Similarly, if i < h, then
by definition of h and by Lemma A.1, `sh−1 ≥ `s
′
h−1 ≥ `s
′
h > `
s
h, and so, by Corollary A.4
and as h < k, `si = `i(µ|∩[0,th); t0, . . . , th−1) ≤ `s
′
i — a contradiction as well.
We conclude by examining the effect on `¬. If k 6= 0, then let t′0 , t0. Regardless of the
value of k, we have t′0 ≥ t0. By definition of s, s′, we have `s¬ = µ
(
[0, t0)
) ≤ µ([0, t′0)) =
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`s
′
¬ .
We note that an alternative proof may also be given via Algorithm 1 and Corol-
lary A.6.
Finally, the last property is that small perturbations in the producers’ strategies
result in quantifiably small changes in the loads on the various producers.
LEMMA A.9 (` IS LIPSCHITZ IN EACH COORDINATE WITH LIPSCHITZ CONSTANT
1). For every j, k ∈ Pn and for every t¯ ∈ T Pn and t′k ∈ T , if tk < t′k, then
∣∣`j(t¯−k, t′k) −
`j(t¯)
∣∣ ≤ µ([tk, t′k)).
PROOF. Assume w.l.o.g. that t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tn−1. If k 6= n − 1, then it is enough to
consider the case tk < t′k ≤ tk+1. Let s and s′ be mixed-consumption Nash equilibria
in (µ; t¯) and (µ; t¯−k, t′k), respectively. Define Sk , Pk ∪ {¬}. We start by showing that∑
j∈Sk `
s′
j −
∑
j∈ Sk `
s
j ≤ µ
(
[tk, t
′
k)
)
.
If k = 0, then this claim holds, as in this case Sk = {¬}, and by definition of s and s′
we have `s
′
¬ − `s¬ = µ
(
[0, t′k)
) − µ([0, tk)) = µ([tk, t′k)). Assume therefore that k > 0 and
assume for contradiction that
∑
j∈Sk `
s′
j −
∑
j∈Sk `
s
j > µ
(
[tk, t
′
k)
)
. As k > 0, we have `s
′
¬ =
µ
(
[0, t0)
)
= `s¬, and so
∑k−1
j=0 `
s′
j −
∑k−1
j=0 `
s
j > µ
(
[tk, t
′
k)
)
as well. Let i ∈ Pn be maximal
s.t. `s
′
i = `
s′
k−1. By definition, i ≥ k − 1. For every k ≤ j ≤ i, by Lemmas A.1 and A.8, we
have `s
′
j ≥ `s
′
i = `
s′
k−1 ≥ `sk−1 ≥ `sj . Therefore, we have
∑i
j=0 `
s′
j −
∑i
j=0 `
s
j > µ
(
[tk, t
′
k)
)
.
If i = n− 1, then we obtain ∑n−1j=0 `s′j >∑n−1j=0 `sj = µ([t0, 1]) — a contradiction; assume,
therefore, that i < n− 1. If i+ 1 6= k, then let t′i+1 , ti+1. Hence,
i∑
j=0
`s
′
j >
i∑
j=0
`sj + µ
(
[tk, t
′
k)
) ≥ µ([0, ti+1))+ µ([tk, t′k)) =
=
{
µ
(
[0, tk)
)
+ µ
(
[tk, t
′
k)
)
= µ
(
[0, t′i+1)
)
i+ 1 = k
µ
(
[0, t′i+1)
)
+ µ
(
[tk, t
′
k)
) ≥ µ([0, t′i+1)) i+ 1 6= k .
Thus, there exists d ≥ t′i+1 s.t. s′j(d) > 0 for some 0 ≤ j ≤ i, but by Lemma A.1 and
by definition of i we notice that `s
′
j ≥ `s
′
i > `
s′
i+1, so s′ is not a Nash equilibrium in
(µ; t¯−k, t′k) — a contradiction as well.
As
∑
j∈Sk `
s′
j −
∑
j∈ Sk `
s
j ≤ µ
(
[tk, t
′
k)
)
and as by Lemma A.8 `s
′
j ≥ `sj for every j ∈ Sk,
we obtain 0 ≤ `s′j −`sj ≤ µ
(
[tk, t
′
k)
)
for every j ∈ Sk. Similarly, As
∑
j∈Sk `
s′
j −
∑
j∈ Sk `
s
j ≤
µ
(
[tk, t
′
k)
)
and as
∑
j∈S `
s′
j = µ(T ) =
∑
j∈S `
s
j , we have
∑n−1
j=k `
s
j −
∑n−1
j=k `
s′
j ≤ µ
(
[tk, t
′
k)
)
,
and as by Lemmas A.7 and A.8 `s
′
j ≤ `sj for every k ≤ j < n, we obtain 0 ≤ `sj − `s
′
j ≤
µ
(
[tk, t
′
k)
)
for every k ≤ j < n, and the proof is complete.
We note that an alternative proof may also be given via Algorithm 1 / Corol-
lary A.6.
A.3. Proofs and Auxiliary Results for Section 4.1
A.3.1. Proofs and Auxiliary Results for Section 4.1.1
LEMMA A.10. Let j ∈ Pn and tj ∈ T . For every t¯−j ∈ T Pn\{j}, we have `j(t¯) ≥ µ([tj ,1])n ,
which constitutes a tight bound.
PROOF. Let s be mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium in (µ; t¯). If µ
(
[tj , 1]
)
= 0,
then `sj = 0 and the claim trivially holds. Assume therefore that µ
(
[tj , 1]
)
> 0. Let k ∈
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arg Maxi∈Pn
∫
[tj ,1]
si dµ. By definition of s,
∫
[tj ,1]
s¬ dµ = 0, and so
∫
[tj ,1]
sk dµ ≥ µ([tj ,1])n
by definition of k. Since
∫
[tj ,1]
sk dµ ≥ µ([tj ,1])n > 0, there exists d ≥ tj s.t. sk(d) > 0. As
j ∈ Sd, by definition of Nash equilibrium we have
∫
[tj ,1]
sj dµ = `
s
j ≥ `sk ≥
∫
[tj ,1]
sk dµ ≥
µ([tj ,1])
n .
Alternatively, by Lemma A.8, `j(t¯) is minimal given tj when ti = tj for every i ∈
Pn \ {j}. By Theorem 3.11, by anonymity, and by definition of Nash equilibrium, the
load on each producer in this case is exactly µ([tj ,1])n .
COROLLARY A.11. Let t¯ ∈ T Pn . For every j ∈ Pn, if tj = 0, then `j(t¯) ≥ µ(T )n .
PROOF. A direct corollary of Lemma A.10.
Definition A.12 (Domination). Let t, t′ be strategies in (n, µ,C).
— We say that t weakly dominates t′ if t is a safe alternative to t′ and moreover, there
exists some strategy profile for all but one of the producers, s.t. playing t gives the
remaining producer strictly higher utility than playing t′.
— We say that t strongly dominates t′ if for every strategy profile for all but one of
the producers, playing t gives the remaining producer strictly higher utility than
playing t′.
LEMMA A.13 (DOMINATION). Let t < t′ ∈ T be strategies in (n, µ,C).
(1) t is a safe alternative to t′.
(2) t weakly dominates t′ iff µ
(
[t, t′)
)
> 0.
(3) t strongly dominates t′ iff µ
(
[t′, 1]
)
< µ([t,1])n .
PROOF. Part 1 follows from Lemma A.7.
We move on to proving Part 2.⇒: Assume that µ([t, t′)) = 0; by Algorithm 1 / Corol-
lary A.6, t and t′ are equivalent, and a fortiori t′ is a safe alternative to t. Nonetheless,
we now also directly show that t and t′ are equivalent. Let t¯−0 ∈ T Pn\{0}, and let s be
a mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium in (µ; t¯−0, t). Let s′ be the mixed-consumption
profile in (µ; t¯−0, t′) s.t. s′|T \[t,t′) = s|T \[t,t′) and s.t. for every d ∈ [t, t′), if Sd = {¬} w.r.t.
(µ; t¯−0, t′) then s′(d) = 1{¬}, and otherwise s′(d) = 1{j} for some j ∈ arg Maxj∈Sd tj . As
s = s′ almost everywhere w.r.t. µ, we have that `s
′
j = `
s
j for all j ∈ Pn. By definition of s,
therefore no type d ∈ T \ [t, t′) has any incentive to deviate from s′ in the latter game.
By Lemma A.1 (for s) and by definition of s′, neither does any type d ∈ [t, t′) have any
incentive to deviate from s′ in the latter game. Therefore, s′ is a Nash equilibrium in
(µ; t¯−0, t′). As in particular `s
′
0 = `
s
0, the proof of this direction is complete.
⇐: Assume that µ([t, t′)) > 0; we will show that t′ is not a safe alternative to t.
Define a , µ
(
[t, t′)
)
> 0, b , µ
(
[t′, 1)
)
and c , µ
({1}). By Algorithm 1, we have
`0(t
′, 1, 1, . . . , 1) = Max{b, b+cn } < Max{a + b, a+b+cn } = `0(t, 1, 1, . . . , 1), and the proof
of this direction is complete as well.
We conclude by proving Part 3. ⇒: Assume that µ([t′, 1]) ≥ µ([t,1])n . Therefore,
µ
(
[t, t′)
) ≤ n−1n · µ([t, 1]), and hence µ([t,t′))n−1 ≤ µ([t,1])n . By Theorem 3.11, by anonymity,
and by definition of Nash equilibrium, the load on every producer, and in particular
on producer 0, in a Nash equilibrium in the n-producer game (µ; t, t, . . . , t) is µ([t,1])n . As
Max{µ([t,t′))n−1 , µ([t,1])n } = µ([t,1])n , by Algorithm 1 the load on every producer, and in par-
ticular on producer 0, in a Nash equilibrium in the game (µ|∩[0,t′); t′, t, t, . . . , t) is µ([t,1])n
as well, as required.
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⇐: Assume that µ([t′, 1]) < µ([t,1])n . Let t¯−0 ∈ T Pn\{0}. By Lemma A.10 and by defini-
tion of legal strategies in the consumer game, we obtain `0(t¯−0, t) ≥ µ([t,1])n > µ
(
[t′, 1]
) ≥
`0(t¯−0, t′).
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.3. The first statement is a direct corollary of Lemma A.13,
and the second — of Corollary A.11.
LEMMA A.14. Let t¯ ∈ T Pn and let s be a mixed-consumption profile in the consumer
game (µ; t¯). If `sj =
µ(T )
n for every j ∈ Pn, and if s¬(d) = 0 whenever Sd 6= {¬}, then s
constitutes a Nash equilibrium in this game.
PROOF. Directly from definition of mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium, no con-
sumer has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from s.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.4. The first part (⇒) follows directly from Corollary A.11.
For the second part (⇐), let t¯ be a pure-strategy profile in (n, µ,C) s.t. `j(t¯) = µ(T )n for
every j ∈ Pn. Assume w.l.o.g. that t0 ≤ · · · ≤ tn−1, and let s be a mixed-consumption
Nash equilibrium in the induced consumer game (µ; t¯); therefore, `sj = `j(t¯) =
µ(T )
n for
every j ∈ Pn. Let k ∈ Pn and let t′k ∈ T ; we will show that producer k has no incentive
to deviate to t′k from tk. If tk < t
′
k, then this follows directly from Lemma A.13(1). We
therefore consider the case in which t′k < tk. Let N , [t′k, t0) (if t0 ≤ t′k, then N = ∅). By
definition of s, we have that µ(N) ≤ µ([0, t0)) = `s¬ = 0. We define a mixed-consumption
profile s′ in the consumer game (µ; t¯−k, t′k) by s
′|N ≡ 1{k} and s′|T \N = s|T \N (if N = ∅,
then s′ = s). (This indeed is a mixed-consumption profile since t′k < tk and by definition
of N .) As µ(N) = 0, we have `s
′
j = `
s
j =
µ(T )
n for every j ∈ Pn. Thus, by Lemma A.14 and
by definition of s′ via N , we conclude that s is a Nash equilibrium in (µ; t¯−k, t′k), and so
k has no incentive to deviate to t′k from tk in this case either.
COROLLARY A.15 (LEAST/MOST NASH EQUILIBRIUM LOAD). Let t0 ≤ · · · ≤ tn−1 ∈
T . The pure-strategy profile t¯ constitutes a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ,C) iff either of
the following equivalent conditions hold.
— `n−1(t¯) = µ(T )n .
— µ
(
[0, t0)
)
= 0 and `0(t¯) = µ(T )n .
PROOF. A direct corollary of Theorem 4.4 and Lemma A.1.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.5. ⇒: Assume that t¯ constitutes a pure-strategy Nash equi-
librium in (n, µ,C). Let s be a mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium in the induced
consumer game (µ; t¯). For every j ∈ Pn, by Theorem 4.4, we obtain µ
(
[tj , 1]
) ≥∑n−1
k=j `
s
k =
n−j
n · µ(T ), and so µ
(
[0, tj)
) ≤ jn · µ(T ).
⇐: Assume that µ([0, tj)) ≤ jn ·µ(T ) for every j ∈ Pn; in particular, µ([0, t0))= 0. Let s
be a mixed-consumption profile in the induced consumer game (µ; t¯). By Theorem 4.4, it
is enough to show that `sj =
µ(T )
n for every j ∈ Pn. Assume for contradiction that this is
not the case. Therefore, as `s¬ = µ
(
[0, t0)
)
= 0, there exists k ∈ Pn s.t. `sk > µ(T )n ; let k be
maximal with this property. By Lemma A.1, we have
∑k
j=0 `
s
k ≥ (k+1)·`sk > (k+1)·µ(T )n ≥
µ
(
[0, tk+1)
)
. Therefore, there exists d ≥ tk+1 s.t. s′j(d) > 0 for some 0 ≤ j ≤ k, but by
definition of k we notice that `s
′
k >
µ(T )
n ≥ `sk+1, so s′ is not a Nash equilibrium — a
contradiction.
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We note that an alternative proof of the second direction (⇐) may also be given via
Algorithm 1 / Corollary A.6.
The second direction (⇐) of Theorem 4.5 can also be proven constructively. Such a
proof is quite tedious in the general case, but simplifies greatly when µ is atomless. E.g.
if µ = U(T ) the uniform measure, then whenever t0 ≤ · · · ≤ tn−1 meet the conditions of
Theorem 4.5, then a Nash equilibrium can be formed by splitting the market as follows:
every d ∈ [0, 1n ) plays the pure strategy 0 ∈ Pn (the conditions of Theorem 4.5 guarantee
that this is a legal strategy for all such d), every d ∈ [ 1n , 2n ) plays the pure strategy
1 ∈ Pn (once again, the conditions of Theorem 4.5 guarantee that this is a legal strategy
for all such d), and so on, until every d ∈ [n−1n , 1], playing the pure strategy n− 1 ∈ Pn.
(We remark that if tj = jn for every j ∈ Pn, then this is in fact the unique Nash
equilibrium among consumers, up to modifications of measure zero. More about this
split and Nash equilibrium — in Theorem 4.31 and Remark 4.32 in Appendix A.4.) The
load on each producer in this case is precisely 1n , and by Lemma A.14 and Theorem 4.4,
the proof is complete.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.6. Assume w.l.o.g. that t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tn−1 and assume
for contradiction that P ⊆ Pn and t¯′ ∈ T P as in the statement exist. Let s be a mixed-
consumption Nash equilibrium in (µ; t¯−P , t¯′). As there exists j ∈ P s.t. `sj > `j(t¯) = µ(T )n
(with the last equality by Theorem 4.4), and as
∑n−1
j=0 `
s
j ≤ µ(T ), there thus exists a
producer k ∈ Pn s.t. `sk < µ(T )n — let ∅ 6= K ⊆ Pn be the set of all such producers; by
definition of P and by Theorem 4.4, we have K ⊆ Pn\P . By Lemma A.1, K = {n−1, n−
2, . . . , n− |K|}. Therefore, and by Theorem 4.5, ∑n−1k=n−|K| `sk < |K|·µ(T )n ≤ µ([tn−|K|, 1]),
and so there exists d ∈ [tn−|K|, 1] s.t. sj(d) > 0 for some 0 ≤ j < n−|K|, but by definition
of K we notice that `s
′
j ≥ µ(T )n > `s
′
n−|K|, and so (as n− |K| /∈ P ) we have that s is not a
Nash equilibrium in (µ; t¯−P , t¯′) — a contradiction.
PROOF OF THEOREMS 4.7 AND 4.8. Theorem 4.7(1) follows directly from Theo-
rem 4.3. We move on to proving Theorem 4.8 and Theorem 4.7(2). Let p¯ be a mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium in (n, µ,C). By Corollary A.11, E
[
`j(p¯)
] ≥ µ(T )n for
every j ∈ Pn; since
∑n−1
j=0 `j(p¯) ≤ µ(T ), and by linearity of expectation, we ob-
tain E
[
`j(p¯)
]
= µ(T )n for every j ∈ Pn. Let j ∈ Pn. By Lemma A.13(1), we have
`j(p¯−j ,1{0}) ≥ `j(p¯). As j has no incentive to deviate from pj to playing 0 ∈ T , we
thus have that `j(p¯−j ,1{0}) = `j(p¯) with probability 1. By Corollary A.11, we have that
`j(p¯−j ,1{0}) ≥ µ(T )n , and so `j(p¯) ≥ µ(T )n with probability 1. As E
[
`j(p¯)
]
= µ(T )n , we have
that `j(p¯) = µ(T )n with probability 1.
Let now p¯ be a mixed-strategy profile in (n, µ,C), s.t. `j(p¯) = µ(T )n with probability 1
for every j ∈ Pn. By Theorem 4.4, the resulting realization is a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium with probability 1, and so with probability 1 no ex-post regret exists and a
fortiori p¯ is a Nash equilibrium.
We move on to proving Theorem 4.7(3). Let p¯ be a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
in (n, µ,C). We iteratively build a permutation pi ∈ Pn! s.t. µ
(
[0,Max supp(ppi(j)))
) ≤ jn
for every j ∈ Pn. Let k ∈ Pn and assume that pi(j) has been defined for all 0 ≤ j < k.
Define U , Pn \ {pi(0), . . . , pi(k − 1)} and let tmin be a random variable denoting the
numerically smallest strategy realization of U , i.e. tmin , minj∈U pj . By Theorem 4.7(2),
with probability 1 we have
∑
j∈U `j(p¯) =
n−k
n · µ(T ); therefore, with probability 1 we
have µ
(
[0, tmin)
) ≤ kn ·µ(T ). Hence, by independence, it is not possible that P [µ([0, pj))>
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k
n · µ(T )
]
> 0 for every j ∈ U . Therefore, there exists pi(k) ∈ U s.t. P [µ([0, ppi(k)))≤
k
n ·µ(T )
]
= 1, and so µ
(
[0,Max supp(ppi(k)))
) ≤ kn ·µ(T ) and the construction is complete.
Let now p¯ be a mixed-strategy profile in (n, µ,C), s.t. µ
(
[0,Max supp(ppi(j)))
) ≤
j
n · µ(T ) for every j ∈ Pn. Therefore, µ
(
[0, ppi(j))
) ≤ jn · µ(T ) for every j ∈ Pn with
probability 1. By Theorem 4.5, the resulting realization is a pure-strategy Nash equi-
librium with probability 1, and so with probability 1 no ex-post regret exists and a
fortiori p¯ is a Nash equilibrium.
We conclude by proving Theorem 4.7(4). Let p¯ be a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium
in (n, µ,C). By Theorems 4.6 and 4.8, a realization of p¯ is with probability 1 a super-
strong equilibrium, and so a fortiori p¯ is a super-strong Nash equilibrium.
A.3.2. Proofs and Auxiliary Results for Section 4.1.2
LEMMA A.16. Let t¯ ∈ T Pn be a pure-strategy profile, let h ∈ arg Maxj∈Pn tj and let
k ∈ Pn. If t¯ is not a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ,C), but nonetheless tk is a best response
to t¯−k, then both `h(t¯) < `k(t¯) and µ
(
[tk, th)
) ≥ µ(T )n .
PROOF. As tk is a best response to t¯−k and by Corollary A.11, `k(t¯) ≥ µ(T )n . As t¯ is not
a Nash equilibrium, by Corollary A.15 we have `h(t¯) < µ(T )n , and so `h(t¯) <
µ(T )
n ≤ `k(t¯).
Therefore, in any mixed-consumption Nash equilibrium in (µ; t¯), no consumer with
type d ≥ th consumes a positive amount from producer k, and so µ
(
[tk, th)
) ≥ `k(t¯) ≥
µ(T )
n , as required.
Definition A.17. Let t¯ ∈ T Pn be a pure-strategy profile in (n, µ,C).
— For every q ∈ {0, . . . , n}, we define
Qq(t¯) ,
{
j ∈ Pn | µ
(
[0, tj)
) ∈ ( q−1n · µ(T ), qn · µ(T )]} ⊆ Pn.
— We define M(t¯) , Max
{
q ∈ {0, . . . , n} ∣∣ Qq(t¯) 6= ∅}.
Remark A.18.
—
(
Qq(t¯)
)
0≤q≤n is a partition of Pn.
— When the CDF of µ is continuous and strictly increasing, then Q0(t¯) is the set of
producers with strategy 0, while Qq(t¯) for 0 < q ≤ n is the set of producers whose
strategies lie in the qth 1/n of T (as measured by µ), i.e. above the (q − 1)th n-tile yet
not above the qth n-tile; for such a CDF, M(t¯) is the index of the 1/n of T containing
the numerically largest strategy (or 0 is all strategies are 0), i.e. it is the index of the
lowest n-tile above which no strategies lie.
LEMMA A.19. Let t¯ ∈ T Pn and let t′k be a best response to t¯−k. If t¯ is not a Nash
equilibrium, then µ
(
[0, t′k)
) ≤ M(t¯)−1n · µ(T ).
PROOF. Let h ∈ arg Maxj∈Pn t′j , where t¯′−k , t¯−k. We consider two cases. If (t¯−k, t′k)
is not a Nash equilibrium, then by Lemma A.16 we have µ
(
[t′k, th)
) ≥ µ(T )n , and so
µ
(
[0, t′k)
) ≤ µ([0, th))− µ(T )n ≤ M(t¯)−1n · µ(T ), as required. Otherwise, (t¯−k, t′k) is a Nash
equilibrium while t¯ is not. Therefore, by Theorem 4.5, there exists ˜ ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} s.t.
µ
(
[0, t′k)
) ≤ ˜n · µ(T ) < µ([0, tk)). As µ([0, tk)) ≤ M(t¯)n · µ(T ), we thus have ˜ < M(t¯), and
so µ
(
[0, t′k)
) ≤ M(t¯)−1n · µ(T ), as required.
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LEMMA A.20. Let δ > 0, let (t¯i, Pi)∞i=0 be a δ-better-response dynamic in (n, µ,C)
and let i ∈ N. If t¯i is not a Nash equilibrium, then all of the following hold.
(1) M(t¯i+1) ≤M(t¯i).
(2) QM(t¯i)(t¯i+1) ⊆ QM(t¯i)(t¯i).
(3) µ
(
[ti+1j , t
i
j)
) ≥ δ, for every j ∈ Pi ∩QM(t¯i)(t¯i+1).
Remark A.21. Finer analysis of similar nature may be used to show that δ may be
replaced with
(
n+ 1−M(t¯i)) · δ in Lemma A.20(3).
PROOF OF LEMMA A.20. We commence by proving Part 1. Let h ∈ arg Maxj∈Pn tij .
It is enough to show that ti+1k < t
i
h for every k ∈ Pi. We consider two cases. If tik is
not a best response to t¯i−k, then by definition of δ-better-response dynamics and by
Lemma A.13(1), ti+1k < t
i
k ≤ tih. Otherwise, tik, and hence also ti+1k , are best responses
to t¯i−k. Therefore, by Lemma A.16, `h(t¯
i) < `k(t¯
i) = `k(t¯
i
−k, t
i+1
k ); in particular, k 6= h. By
anonymity and by Lemma A.8 (for j = h), we have `k(t¯i−k, t
i
h) = `h(t¯
i
−k, t
i
h) ≤ `h(t¯i) <
`k(t¯
i
−k, t
i+1
k ). Therefore, by Lemma A.7, t
i+1
k < t
i
h in this case as well, as required.
We now proceed to prove Part 2. Let k ∈ Pn \ QM(t¯i)(t¯i); we must show that k /∈
QM(t¯i)(t¯
i+1). It is enough to consider the scenario in which k ∈ Pi, and to show that
under this condition, µ
(
[0, ti+1k )
) ≤ M(t¯i)−1n ·µ(T ). Once again, we consider two cases. If
tik is not a best response to t¯
i
−k, then by definition of δ-better-response dynamics and by
Lemma A.13(1), ti+1k < t
i
k and so µ
(
[0, ti+1k )
) ≤ µ([0, tik)) ≤ M(t¯i)−1n · µ(T ), as required.
Otherwise, tik, and hence also t
i+1
k , are best responses to t¯
i
−k. By Lemma A.19, in this
case we have µ
(
[0, ti+1k )
) ≤ M(t¯i)−1n · µ(T ) as well, as required.
We conclude by proving Part 3. Let k ∈ Pi ∩ QM(t¯i)(t¯i+1). As µ
(
[0, ti+1k )
)
>
M(t¯i)−1
n · µ(T ), by Lemma A.19 we have that ti+1k is not a best response to t¯i−k. There-
fore, by definition of δ-better-response dynamics, we have that `k(t¯i−k, t
i+1
k ) ≥ `k(t¯i) + δ,
and so by Lemmas A.7 and A.9, µ
(
[ti+1k , t
i
k)
) ≥ δ as required.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.15. Let δ > 0 and let (t¯i, Pi)∞i=0 be a δ-better-response dy-
namic in (n, µ,C). By definition, M(t¯0) ≤ n. By Lemma A.20, M = M(t¯i) decreases
by at least 1 in every
⌈µ(T )
δn
⌉
rounds within which a Nash equilibrium is not reached.
Therefore, if a Nash equilibrium is not reached in at most n · ⌈µ(T )δn ⌉ rounds from 0,
then M(t¯i) = 0 and so t¯i ≡ 0, which by Theorem 4.5 is a Nash equilibrium. If t¯i is a
Nash equilibrium, then by Theorem 4.5, M(t¯i+1) ≤ n− 1, and so if a Nash equilibrium
is not reached in at most (n − 1) · ⌈µ(T )δn ⌉ rounds from i + 1, then we have M = 0 once
more, and so a Nash equilibrium is reached again.
The tighter bounds described in Remark 4.16 may be shown in a similar manner,
due to Remark A.21.
Definition A.22 (k-Canonical Form). Let k ∈ Pn and let t¯ ∈ T Pn be a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium in (n, µ,C). We say that t¯ is in k-canonical form if all of the follow-
ing hold.
(1) t0 ≤ t1 ≤ · · · ≤ tk−1 ≤ tk+1 ≤ · · · ≤ tn−1.
(2) µ
(
[0, tj)
) ≤ jn for every j < k.
(3) Either k = n− 1, or µ([0, tk+1)) > kn · µ(T ).
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LEMMA A.23. Let k ∈ Pn and let t¯ ∈ T Pn be a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
in (n, µ,C). There exists a permutation pi ∈ Pn! s.t. (tpi(0), tpi(1), . . . , tpi(n−1)) is in
pi−1(k)-canonical form.
PROOF. We start by defining pi such that tpi(0) ≤ tpi(1) ≤ · · · ≤ tpi(n−1). In particular,
we have
tpi(0) ≤ tpi(1) ≤ · · · ≤ tpi−1(k)−1 ≤ tpi−1(k)+1 ≤ · · · ≤ tpi(n−1). (1)
By Theorem 4.5, we have that
µ
(
[0, tpi(j)
) ≤ jn · µ(T ) (2)
for every j ∈ Pn, and in particular for every j < pi−1(k). If pi−1(k) = n − 1 or
µ
(
[0, tpi(pi−1(k)+1))
)
> pi
−1(k)
n · µ(T ), then pi is a permutation as required. Otherwise,
we have
µ
(
[0, tpi(pi−1(k)+1))
) ≤ pi−1(k)n · µ(T ). (3)
In this case, we modify pi to create a new permutation pi′ ∈ Pn! by incrementing pi−1(k),
or more formally — by swapping the values of coordinates pi−1(k) and pi−1(k) + 1 of pi.
We note that Eq. (1) still holds w.r.t. pi′ (i.e. by substituting pi′ for pi). By Eq. (2) w.r.t. pi
for all j < pi−1(k), we have that Eq. (2) holds w.r.t. pi′ for all j < pi′−1(k) − 1; by Eq. (3)
w.r.t. pi, we have that Eq. (2) holds w.r.t. pi′ for j = pi′−1(k) − 1 as well. Once again,
if pi′−1(k) = n − 1 or µ([0, tpi′(pi′−1(k)+1))) > pi′−1(k)n · µ(T ), then pi′ is a permutation as
required. Otherwise, Eq. (3) holds w.r.t. pi′, and we repeat the modification step. As
pi−1(k) is incremented in each modification step, this process concludes in at most n−1
steps, as it concludes if pi−1(k) reaches n− 1.
LEMMA A.24. Let k ∈ Pn and let t¯ ∈ T Pn be a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in
(n, µ,C) in k-canonical form. Both of the following hold.
(1) µ
(
[0, tj)
) ≤ jn for every j ∈ Pn.
(2) Either k = n− 1 or tk < tk+1.
(3) For every t ∈ T , (t¯−k, t) is a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ,C) iff µ
(
[0, t)
) ≤ kn .
PROOF. By definition of k-canonical form, µ
(
[0, tj)
) ≤ jn for every j < k. By defini-
tion of k-canonical form, we also have for every n > j > k that µ
(
[0, tj)
) ≥ µ([0, tk+1)) >
k
n · µ(T ). Therefore, by Theorem 4.5, µ
(
[0, tj)
) ≤ kn · µ(T ) for every j ≤ k, and in par-
ticular µ
(
[0, tk)
) ≤ kn · µ(T ). Furthermore, we obtain that (tk+1, tk+2, . . . , tn−1) are the
n−k− 1 numerically largest strategies in t¯, and as they are sorted, by Theorem 4.5 we
have that µ
(
[0, tj)
) ≤ jn ·µ(T ) for every j > k as well and the proof of Part 1 is complete.
Assume that k < n− 1. As we have shown that µ([0, tk)) ≤ kn ·µ(T ), but by definition
of k-canonical form µ
(
[0, tk+1)
)
> kn · µ(T ), we have that tk < tk+1 and Part 2 holds.
We conclude by proving Part 3; let t ∈ T . If µ([0, t)) ≤ kn , then by Part 1 and Theo-
rem 4.5, (t¯−k, t) is a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ,C). Recall that µ
(
[0, tj)
)
> kn · µ(T ) for
every j > k; therefore, if µ
(
[0, t)
)
> kn · µ(T ) as well, then by Theorem 4.5, (t¯−k, t) is a
not a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ,C).
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.18. Let t¯ ∈ T Pn be a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ,C) and
let k ∈ Pn. By Lemma A.23, assume w.l.o.g. that t¯ is in k-canonical form. By
Lemma A.24(3), it is enough to show that each tk < t′k ≤ 1 s.t. µ
(
[0, t′k)
)
> kn · µ(T )
is not a best response to t¯−k in (n, µ,C). If k < n + 1, then by Lemma A.24(2),
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tk < tk+1 and so, by Lemma A.13 and since µ
(
[0, tk+1)
)
> kn · µ(T ), it is enough
to consider tk < t′k ≤ tk+1 in this case. By definition, for every j ≤ k, we have
µ
(
[0, t′k)
)
> kn · µ(T ) ≥ µ
(
[0, tj)
)
and so t′k > tj .
Let s′ and s′′ be mixed-consumption Nash equilibria in the k-producer consumer
game (µ|∩[0,t′k); t0, . . . , tk−1) and in the (n−k)-producer game (µ|∩[t′k,1]; t′k, tk+1, . . . , tn−1),
respectively; by abuse of notation, we think of s′′ as s′′ = (s′′¬, s′′k , s
′′
k+1, . . . , s
′′
n−1) (s′′¬ ≡ 0
by definition of s′′) and for each k ≤ j < n define `s′′j ,
∫
T s
′′
j d(µ|∩[t′k,1]). For every
0 ≤ j < k, we have by definition of k-canonical form that
µ
(
[0, tj)
) ≤ j
n
· µ(T ) = j
k
· k
n
· µ(T ) < j
k
· µ([0, t′k)) = jk · µ|∩[0,t′k)(T ).
By Theorem 4.5, (t0, . . . , tk−1) is therefore a Nash equilibrium in (k, µ|∩[0,t′k),C), and
so by Theorem 4.4 we have `s
′
j =
µ|∩[0,t′
k
)(T )
k =
µ([0,t′k))
k >
µ(T )
n for every 0 ≤ j < k.
For every k < j < n, we have by Lemma A.24(1) that
µ
(
[tj , 1]
) ≥ n− j
n
· µ(T ) > n− j
n
· n
n− k · µ
(
[t′k, 1]
)
=
n− j
n− k · µ
(
[t′k, 1]
)
,
and therefore
µ
(
[t′k, tj)
)
= µ
(
[t′k, 1]
)− µ([tj , 1]) < µ([t′k, 1])− n− jn− k · µ([t′k, 1]) = j − kn− k · µ|∩[t′k,1](T ).
Note that µ
(
[t′k, t
′
k)
)
= 0 = k−kn−k · µ|∩[t′k,1](T ) trivially holds as well. By Theorem 4.5,
(t′k, tk+1, tk+2, . . . , tn−1) is therefore a Nash equilibrium in (n − k, µ|∩[t′k,1],C), and so
by Theorem 4.4 we have that `s
′′
j =
µ|∩[t′
k
,1](T )
n−k =
µ([t′k,1])
n−k <
µ(T )
n for every k ≤ j < n.
Let s be the mixed-consumption profile defined by sj |[0,t′k) = s′j for every j ∈ {¬,
0, 1, . . . , k − 1} and sj |[0,t′k) ≡ 0 for every k ≤ j < n, and by sj |[t′k,1] = s′′j for every
k ≤ j < n and sj |[t′k,1] ≡ 0 for every j ∈ {¬, 0, 1, . . . , k − 1}. By definition of s′ and of
s′′, we have that s is a legal mixed-consumption profile in (µ; t¯−k, t′k), and furthermore,
that `sj = `s
′
j =
µ([0,t′k))
k for every j ∈ {¬, 0, 1, . . . , k − 1}, and that `sj = `s
′′
j =
µ([t′k,1])
n−k
for every k ≤ j < n. By the former, and as s′ is a Nash equilibrium, no type d ∈ [0, t′k)
has any incentive to deviate from s in (µ; t¯−k, t′k), and by the latter, as s
′′ is a Nash
equilibrium and as µ([t
′
k,1])
n−k <
µ(T )
n <
µ([0,t′k))
k , we have that neither does any type d ∈
[t′k, 1]. Therefore, s is a Nash equilibrium in (µ; t¯−k, t
′
k). As `k(t¯−k, t
′
k) = `
s
k =
µ([t′k,1])
n−k <
µ(T )
n = `k(t¯) (with the last equality by Theorem 4.4, since t¯ is a Nash equilibrium in
(n, µ,C)), we have that producer k strictly prefers tk over t′k given t¯−k, and so t′k is not
a best response to t¯−k in (n, µ,C), as required.
We note that an alternative proof may also be given via Algorithm 1 / Corol-
lary A.6.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4.19. A direct corollary of Theorems 4.15 and 4.18 and Re-
mark 4.17.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.20. It is enough to show that some nonequilibrium can
be reached in a finite number of steps from any Nash equilibrium. Let t ∈ T s.t. 0 <
µ
(
[0, t)
) ≤ n−1n ·µ(T ) (there must exist such t by definition of µ) and let j ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}
be minimal s.t. µ
(
[0, t)
) ≤ jn · µ(T ).
By Theorem 4.3, 0 ∈ T is a best-response by any producer to any Nash equilibrium,
and so a (nonlazy) best-response dynamic can reach (0, 0, . . . , 0) from any Nash equi-
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librium in one round. Let i ∈ N be more than one round into the future after reaching
(0, 0, . . . , 0), s.t. |Pi| > 1, and let k, h ∈ Pi s.t. k 6= h. By definition of t and j and by
Theorem 4.5, any strategy profile in which at most n− j producers play t and the rest
play 0 is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, within one round after reaching (0, 0, . . . , 0), a
Nash equilibrium in which j + 1 producers, including k and h, play 0 and the rest play
t, can be reached, and can be lazily maintained until the step i. In step i, all triggered
producers may play t ∈ T , which is a best response for each of them since at least j
producers playing 0 and the rest playing t is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, and as k
and h both switch from playing 0 to playing t at i, at least n− j + 1 producers play t at
i+ 1, which, by definition of j and by Theorem 4.5, is a nonequilibrium.
LEMMA A.25. Let k ∈ Pn, let t¯−k ∈ T Pn\{k}. If µ
(
[0, tj)
)
> 0 for all j ∈ Pn \ {k}, then
t′k ∈ T is a best response (by k) to t¯−k in (n, µ,C) iff µ
(
[0, t′k)
)
= 0.
PROOF. By Lemma A.13, all strategies t ∈ T for which µ(([0, t)) = 0 are equivalent.
As in particular, t = 0 ∈ T is such a strategy, it is therefore enough to show that k
strictly prefers to play 0 ∈ T over any t′k s.t. µ
(
[0, t′k)
)
> 0. By Lemma A.13(1), it is
enough to consider the case in which t′k ≤ tj for all j ∈ Pn \ {k}. By Algorithm 1 (for
tn as defined there), `k(t¯−k, 0) = Max0<j≤n
µ([0,tj))
j > Max0<j≤n
µ([t′k,tj))
j = `k(t¯−k, t
′
k), as
required.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.22. As in the proof of Theorem 4.15, and as a best-response
dynamic is also a µ(T )-better-response dynamic, we have that M(t¯0) ≤ n (and M ≤
n− 1 on every step immediately following a Nash equilibrium), and that M decreases
by at least 1 every round if a Nash equilibrium is not reached. Let i ∈ N s.t. M(t¯i) = 1,
M(t¯i−1) = 2, and t¯i−1 is not a Nash equilibrium; it is enough to show that t¯i is a Nash
equilibrium.
Since M(t¯i) = 1, by Theorem 4.5 it is enough to show that there exists j ∈ Pn s.t.
µ
(
[0, tij)
)
= 0. As M(t¯i) 6= M(t¯i−1), we have Pi−1 6= ∅. By Theorem 4.5, as M(t¯i−1) = 2
but t¯i−1 is not a Nash equilibrium, there exists at most one producer k ∈ Pn s.t.
µ
(
[0, ti−1k )
)
= 0. If there exists no such producer, then by Lemma A.25, we have
µ
(
[0, tij)
)
= 0 for every j ∈ Pi, and as Pi 6= ∅, the proof is complete. Otherwise, there
exists a unique k ∈ Pn s.t. µ
(
[0, ti−1k )
)
= 0. If k /∈ Pi, then tik = ti−1k and the proof is
complete. Otherwise, k ∈ Pi and by Lemma A.25, we have µ
(
[0, tik)
)
= 0, as required.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4.25. A direct corollary of Theorems 4.18 and 4.22, Re-
mark 4.17, and Example 4.24.
A.4. Proofs and Auxiliary Results for Section 4.2
A.4.1. Proofs and Auxiliary Results for Section 4.2.1
LEMMA A.26 (DOMINATION). Let t 6= t′ ∈ T be strategies in (n, µ,F ). t is a safe
alternative to t′ iff either of the following hold. In either case, t strongly dominates t′
(1) t > t′ and µ
(
[t′, t)
)
= 0.
(2) µ
(
[t′, 1]
)
< µ([t,1])n .
PROOF. t is a safe alternative to (alternatively, strongly dominates) t′ iff either t
always produces greater load than t′, or t always produces at least as much load as t′
and in addition t > t′. By Lemma A.13(3), the former occurs iff µ
(
[t′, 1]
)
< µ([t,1])n ; by
Lemma A.13(1,2), if t > t′, then the latter occurs iff µ
(
[t′, t)
)
= 0
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LEMMA A.27. µ
(⋃{
[t, t′)
∣∣∣ 0 ≤ t < t′ & µ([t, t′)) ≤ m}) ≤ m, for every t′ ∈ T and
m ∈ R≥.
PROOF. Define U ,
⋃{
[t, t′)
∣∣∣ 0 ≤ t < t′ & µ([t, t′)) ≤ m}. If U = ∅, then µ(U) = 0 ≤
m and the proof is complete; assume, therefore, that U 6= ∅ and let u , inf U ≥ 0. By
definition, U is connected, and therefore by definition of U and u, we have that either
U = [u, t′) or U = (u, t′). If U = [u, t′), then u ∈ U , and by definition of U , we obtain
µ(U) = µ
(
[u, t′)
) ≤ m, as required; assume therefore, that U = (u, t′). In this case,
U =
⋃{
[t, t′)
∣∣∣ t ∈ [0, t′) ∩ Q & µ([t, t′)) ≤ m}, and by continuity of µ from below, we
obtain µ(U) ≤ m, as required.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.27. Let t ∈ T be a dominant strategy in this game. By
Lemma A.26, both µ
(
[0, t)
)
= 0 (as t is a safe alternative to 0) and µ
(
[t′, 1]
)
< µ([t,1])n for
every t′ > t (as t is a safe alternative to every such t′). (Alternatively, the former holds
as by definition, any strategy dominant w.r.t. fine preferences is also dominant w.r.t.
coarse preferences, and by Theorem 4.3.) By the former, µ
(
[t, 1]
)
= µ(T ), and therefore
and by the latter, µ
(
[t′, 1]
)
< µ(T )n for every t
′ ∈ (t, 1) ∩ Q. Therefore, by continuity of
µ from below, µ
(
(t, 1]
) ≤ µ(T )n . Hence, µ({t}) = µ([0, t]) ≥ n−1n · µ(T ). (Conversely, by
Lemma A.26, it is easy to see that if there indeed exists t ∈ T s.t. µ([0, t)) = 0 and
µ
(
[t′, 1]
)
< µ(T )n for every t
′ > t, then it constitutes the unique dominant strategy.)
For the second statement, we note that by Lemma A.26, the set of dominated strate-
gies is{
t ∈ T
∣∣∣ µ([t, 1]) < µ(T )n } ∪ {t ∈ T ∣∣∣ ∃t < t′ ≤ 1 : µ([t, t′)) = 0} =
=
⋃{
[t, 1]
∣∣∣ t∈T & µ([t, 1])< µ(T )n } ∪⋃{[t, t′) ∣∣∣ t′∈T ∩Q & 0≤ t<t′ & µ([t, t′))=0}.
By σ-additivity of µ and by Lemma A.27 (applied twice),
µ
({
t ∈ T
∣∣∣ µ([t, 1]) < µ(T )n } ∪ {t ∈ T ∣∣∣ ∃t < t′ ≤ 1 : µ([t, t′)) = 0}) ≤
≤ µ
(⋃{
[t, 1]
∣∣∣ t ∈ T & µ([t, 1]) < µ(T )n })+
+
∑
t′∈T ∩Q
µ
(⋃{
[t, t′)
∣∣∣ 0 ≤ t < t′ & µ([t, t′)) = 0}) ≤
≤ µ(T )
n
+ 0 =
µ(T )
n
.
We note that this bound is attained if µ is atomless, as in this case it is straightforward
to verify that µ
(⋃{
[t, 1] | t ∈ T & µ([t, 1]) < µ(T )n }) = µ(T )n .
The second statement leads to an extremely concise, yet somewhat more obscure,
proof for the first one. If a dominant strategy exists, then it is a safe alternative to all
other strategies; in particular, all other strategies have safe alternatives (other than
themselves). By the second statement, at least n−1n of µ is therefore concentrated on
this dominated strategy, and the proof is complete.
LEMMA A.28.
{
t ∈ T | µ([t′, t)) ≤ m} attains a maximum value for every t′ ∈ T and
m ∈ R≥.
PROOF. Denote S ,
{
t ∈ T | µ([t′, t)) ≤ m}. We note that t′ ∈ S. If t′ = supS,
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then t′ = MaxS and the proof is complete. Assume, therefore, that t′ < supS. Let
U ,
⋃{
[t′, t) | t ∈ T & µ([t′, t)) ≤ m}. As t′ < supS, we have that U 6= ∅. Let
u , supU ≤ 1. By definition of U and of u, we have U = [t′, u). By definition of U and
of S, we have that u = supU = supS, and so it is enough to show that u ∈ S, i.e. that
µ
(
[t′, u)
) ≤ m. As U = [t′, u), this is equivalent to showing that µ(U) ≤ m. Observe that
U =
⋃{
[t′, t)
∣∣∣ t ∈ T ∩Q & µ([t′, t)) ≤ m}.
By continuity of µ from below, we thus obtain µ(U) ≤ m, as required.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.28. For every j ∈ Pn, let tj , Max
{
t ∈ T | µ([0, t)) ≤
j
n · µ(T )
}
. (tj is well-defined by Lemma A.28.) By Theorem 4.5, t¯ is a Nash equilib-
rium in (n, µ,C), and so by Theorem 4.4, `j(t¯) = µ(T )n for every j ∈ Pn. We now first
show that no Nash equilibrium other than t¯ (up to permutations) exists in (n, µ,F ),
and then show that t¯ (and hence all permutations thereof) is a super-strong Nash equi-
librium in (n, µ,F ).
Let t′0 ≤ · · · ≤ t′n−1 ∈ T s.t. t¯′ is a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ,F ). We will show
that t′j = tj for every j ∈ Pn. By definition of coarse and fine preferences, t¯′ is also
a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ,C). Therefore, by Theorem 4.5 we have that µ
(
[0, t′j)
) ≤
j
n · µ(T ) for every j ∈ Pn. Hence we have for every j ∈ Pn both that t′j ≤ tj and (by
Theorem 4.5 again) that (t¯′−j , tj) is a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ,C) as well. Therefore,
by Theorem 4.4, `j(t¯′) = µ(T )n = `j(t¯
′
−j , tj). As t¯′ is a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ,F ), we
therefore have that t′j ≥ tj , and so t′j = tj , as required.
We now show that t¯ is a super-strong Nash equilibrium in (n, µ,F ). Assume for
contradiction that there exists a coalition P ⊆ Pn and strategies t¯′ = (t′j)j∈P ∈ T P
s.t. j weakly prefers (t¯−P , t¯′) over t¯ w.r.t. fine preferences for every j ∈ P , with a strict
preference for at least one producer j ∈ P . For every j ∈ P , as j weakly prefers (t¯−P , t¯′)
over t¯, we have that `j(t¯−P , t¯′) ≥ `j(t¯). As t¯ is a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ,C), by The-
orem 4.6, we therefore have `j(t¯−P , t¯′) = `j(t¯) for every j ∈ P . Therefore, by definition
of P and t¯′, we have t′j ≥ tj for every j ∈ P , with a strict inequality for at least one
producer j ∈ P — let j be such a producer for which t′j is greatest. Assume w.l.o.g. that
either j = n − 1 or tj < tj+1; therefore, t¯ is in j-canonical form. As t¯ is also a Nash
equilibrium in (n, µ,C), by Theorem 4.18, by Lemma A.24(3), by definition of tj , and
as t′j > tj , we have `j(t¯) > `j(t¯−j , t′j). By Lemma A.8 and by definition of j, we have
`j(t¯−j , t′j) ≥ `j(t¯−P , t¯′). Therefore, `j(t¯) > `j(t¯−j , t′j) ≥ `j(t¯−P , t¯′) — a contradiction.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4.29. Since the CDF of µ is continuous and strictly increas-
ing, for every j ∈ Pn there exists a unique strategy tj ∈ T s.t. µ
(
[0, tj)
)
= jn ·µ(T ); hence,
tj = Max
{
t ∈ T | µ([0, t)) ≤ jn · µ(T )} and by Theorem 4.28 the proof is complete.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.30. Direct from definition of (n, µ,F ), as no player is
ever indifferent between any two strategies, regardless of the information such player
possesses regarding the strategies of the other players.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.31. By Theorem 4.28, for every j ∈ Pn we have{
d ∈ T | µ([0, d)) ∈ ( jn · µ(T ), j+1n · µ(T )]} ⊆ [tj , tj+1).
Therefore, it is enough to show that sj(d) = 1 for almost all d ∈ [tj , tj+1). By definition of
s, this is equivalent to showing that
∫
[tj ,tj+1)
sjdµ = µ
(
[tj , tj+1)
)
for every j ∈ Pn, where
tn , 1. As µ is atomless, by Theorem 4.28 and by definition of tn we have µ
(
[tj , tj+1)
)
=
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µ
(
[0, tj+1)
) − µ([0, tj)) = j+1n · µ(T ) − jn · µ(T ) = µ(T )n for every j ∈ Pn. We prove the
theorem by induction on j. Let k ∈ Pn and assume that the theorem holds for every
0 ≤ j < k; we now show that it holds for j = k as well.
For every 0 ≤ j < k, by the induction hypothesis, ∫
[tj ,tj+1)
sjdµ = µ
(
[tj , tj+1)
)
= µ(T )n .
By Theorem 4.28 and by definition of `j(t¯) and of `sj ,
µ(T )
n
= `j(t¯) = `
s
j =
∫
T
sjdµ ≥
∫
[tj ,tj+1)
sjdµ+
∫
[tk,tk+1)
sjdµ =
µ(T )
n
+
∫
[tk,tk+1)
sjdµ,
and so
∫
[tk,tk+1)
sjdµ = 0. By definition of Nash equilibrium, s¬(d) = 0 for every d ≥ tk,
and therefore
∫
[tk,tk+1)
s¬dµ = 0 as well. Let Sk , {¬, 0, 1, 2, . . . , k − 1}; by definition of
s, we have that s(d) ∈ ∆Sk for every d ∈ [tk, tk+1). Therefore,∫
[tk,tk+1)
skdµ = µ
(
[tk, tk+1)
)−∑
j∈Sk
∫
[tk,tk+1)
sjdµ =
µ(T )
n
− 0 = µ([tk, tk+1)),
and the proof by induction is complete.
A.4.2. Proofs for Section 4.2.2
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.34 (NONCONSTRUCTIVE). Let ˜` , `j(t¯−j , 0); by Theo-
rem 4.3, ˜` is the maximum load attainable by j given t¯−j . Define S ,
{
µ
(
[0, t)
) ∣∣ t ∈
T & `j(t¯−j , t) = ˜`
}
. Observe that S 6= ∅ as 0 ∈ S (given by t = 0); let m , supS.
By Lemma A.13(1), every t ∈ T s.t. µ([0, t)) < m maximizes `j(t¯−j , t), while every
t ∈ T s.t. µ([0, t)) > m does not. Assume for contradiction that there exists t ∈ T s.t.
µ
(
[0, t)
)
= m and `j(t¯−j , t) < ˜`. Let ε , ˜`− `j(t¯−j , t) > 0. By definition of m, there exists
t′ s.t. m ≥ µ([0, t′)) > m − ε and `j(t¯−j , t′) = ˜` = `j(t¯−j , t) + ε; by Lemma A.9, this
is a contradiction. (We note that we have not shown (yet) that there exists t ∈ T s.t.
µ
(
[0, t)
)
= m, but rather that every such t maximizes the load on j.) Therefore, we have
that the set of load-maximizing strategies for j is precisely
{
t ∈ T ∣∣ µ([0, t)) ≤ m}. By
Lemma A.28, this set attains a maximum value. As by definition we have that a best
response in (n, µ,F ) is a numerically largest load-maximizing response, we obtain
that this maximum value is a best response as required. Uniqueness follows directly
from definition of fine preferences.
Before constructively proving Proposition 4.34, we first constructively prove it for
two special cases.
COROLLARY A.29 (PROPOSITION 4.34 — SPECIAL CASE: LARGE STRATEGIES).
Let k ∈ Pn, and let t¯−k ∈ T Pn\{k}. If µ
(
[0, tj)
)
> 0 for all j ∈ Pn \ {k}, then the unique
best response (by k) to t¯−k in (n, µ,F ) is Max
{
t ∈ T | µ([0, t)) = 0}.
PROOF. A direct corollary of Lemma A.25, as a best response in (n, µ,F ) is a nu-
merically largest load-maximizing response; the specified strategy is well defined by
Lemma A.28.
LEMMA A.30 (PROPOSITION 4.34 — SPECIAL CASE: COARSE EQUILIBRIUM). Let
t¯ ∈ T Pn be a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ,C). For every j ∈ Pn, a best response (by j) to
t¯−j exists in (n, µ,F ).
PROOF (CONSTRUCTIVE). By Lemma A.23, assume w.l.o.g. that t¯ is in j-canonical
form. We will show that a best response as required is given by t′j , Max
{
t ∈ T |
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µ
(
[0, t)
) ≤ jn · µ(T )}. (t′j is well defined by Lemma A.28.) By Lemma A.24(3) and by
Theorem 4.18, a strategy t ∈ T maximizes `j(t¯−j , t) iff µ
(
[0, t)
) ≤ jn · µ(T ). As by
definition we have that a best response in (n, µ,F ) is a numerically largest load-
maximizing response, we obtain that t′j is a best response as required.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.34 (CONSTRUCTIVE). W.l.o.g. we prove the result for
j = 0. Assume w.l.o.g. that t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tn−1. Uniqueness follows directly from
definition of fine preferences; it is therefore enough to show that a best response ex-
ists. If µ
(
[0, t1)
)
> 0, then by Corollary A.29 a best response exists as required. Assume
therefore henceforth that µ
(
[0, t1)
)
= 0. If (t¯−0, 0) is a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ,C),
then by Lemma A.30 a best response exists as required. Assume therefore henceforth
that (t¯−0, 0) is not a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ,C).
Let k ∈ Pn be minimal s.t. `k(t¯−0, 0) < `0(t¯−0, 0). (Such k exists by Corollary A.15,
since (t¯−0, 0) is not a Nash equilibrium in (n, µ,C); by definition, k > 0.) By definition
of k and by Corollary A.4 and Lemma A.14, (0, t1, t2, . . . , tk−1) is a Nash equilibrium in
(k, µ|∩[0,tk),C). By Lemma A.30, there exists a best response t0 ∈ T to (t1, t2, . . . , tk−1)
in (k, µ|∩[0,tk),F ). We claim that t0 is a best response to t¯−0 in (n, µ,F ) as well.
As `k(t¯−0, 0) < `0(t¯−0, 0), we have that `0(t¯−0, 0) ≤ µ
(
[0, tk)
)
, and in particular
µ
(
[0, tk)
)
> 0. Therefore, by Lemma A.13(3) and by definition of t0, we obtain t0 < tk. By
Theorem 4.18, (t0, t1, . . . , tk−1) is also a Nash equilibrium in (k, µ|∩[0,tk),C). Therefore,
by Theorem 4.4, `j(µ|∩[0,tk); 0, t1, t2, . . . , tk−1) = µ([0,tk))k = `j(µ|∩[0,tk); t0, t1, . . . , tk−1) for
every j ∈ Pk. By the construction in the proof of Theorem 3.10 and as t0 < tk, there-
fore `j(t¯) = `j(t¯−0, 0) for every j ∈ Pn. By Corollary A.4 and by definition of k, we
have `j(t¯) = `j(t¯−0, 0) = `j(µ|∩[0,tk); 0, t1, t2, . . . , tk−1) = µ([0,tk))k for every j ∈ Pk. As
`0(t¯) = `0(t¯−0, 0), by Theorem 4.3 we have that t0 maximizes the load on producer 0 in
(n, µ,F ).
Let h ∈ Pk s.t. th ≤ t0 < th+1. Such h > 0 exists as µ
(
[0, t1)
)
= 0 and since t0 ≥
Max
{
t ∈ T | µ([0, t)) = 0} ≥ t1 by Lemma A.13 (this maximum value is attained by
Lemma A.28), and h < k since t0 < tk. It remains to show that every t′0 ∈ (t0, 1]) does
not maximize the load on producer 0 in (n, µ,F ). By Lemma A.13(1), it is enough to
consider the case t0 < t′0 < th+1. Note that tk > t0 ≥ t1 and so k > 1.
By definition of t′0 and t0, we have that t′0 does not maximize the load on producer
0 in (k, µ|∩[0,tk),F ). By Corollary A.4 and by Corollary A.15 (since µ
(
[0, t1)
)
= 0),
`1(t¯−0, t′0) ≥ `1(µ|∩[0,tk); t′0, t1, . . . , tk−1) > µ([0,tk))k = `1(t¯), and so by Algorithm 1,
`1(t¯−0, t′0) =
µ([0,t′0))
h and so `j(t¯−0, t
′
0) =
µ([0,t′0))
h for every 0 < j ≤ h, and in par-
ticular for j = h. Therefore, and by Lemma A.13(1), `h(t¯−0, t′0) = `1(t¯−0, t′0) >
`1(t¯) = `0(t¯) ≥ `0(t¯−0, t′0). As µ([0,t
′
0))
h = `1(t¯−0, t
′
0) >
µ([0,tk))
k , we have µ
(
[t′0, tj)
)
=
µ
(
[0, tj)
)−µ([0, t′0)) < µ([0, tj))− hk ·µ([0, tk)) for every j > h. As `h(t¯−0, t′0) > `0(t¯−0, t′0),
by definition of h and by Algorithm 1 and Corollary A.6, we obtain (for tn as defined
there) that `0(t¯−0, t′0) = Maxh<j≤n
µ([t′0,tj))
j−h < Maxh<j≤n
(
µ
(
[0, tj)
)− hk ·µ([0, tk))) · 1j−h =
Maxh<j≤n
(
µ
(
[0, tj)
)−∑hi=1 `i(t¯)) · 1j−h = `0(t¯), and the proof is complete.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4.35. A direct corollary of Theorems 4.15 and 4.22, as any
weakly-/δ-better-/best-response dynamic w.r.t. fine preferences is also a weakly-/δ-
better-/best-response dynamic w.r.t. coarse preferences.
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.36. Let (t¯0, Pi)∞i=0 be a sequential δ-better-response dy-
namic in (n, µ,F ) s.t. t¯0 is a Nash equilibrium w.r.t. (n, µ,C). Let k ∈ Pn and let
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ı˜ be minimal s.t. k ∈ Pı˜. It is enough to show that tik is constant for i > ı˜, as this implies
that after one round t¯i is constant regardless of Pi, and is thus a Nash equilibrium in
(n, µ,F ).
By Theorem 4.18, t¯i is a Nash equilibrium w.r.t. (n, µ,C) for every i ∈ N; there-
fore, by Theorem 4.4, the loads on all producers are constant throughout this dynamic.
Therefore, by definition of δ-better-response dynamics, we have both that (t¯0, Pi)∞i=0 is
a best-response dynamic in (n, µ,F ), and that (tij)∞i=0 is monotone-nondecreasing for
every j ∈ Pn.
Let i > ı˜ s.t. k ∈ Pi. As ti+1k ≥ tı˜+1k , it is enough to show that ti+1k ≤ tı˜+1k . As
t¯i+1 ≥ (t¯ı˜+1−k , ti+1k ) in every coordinate, by Theorem 4.5 and since t¯i+1 is a Nash equilib-
rium w.r.t. (n, µ,C), so is (t¯ı˜+1−k , ti+1k ), and so ti+1k maximizes the load on k given t¯ı˜+1−k ;
therefore, and as tı˜+1k is a best response to t¯
ı˜+1
−k w.r.t. (n, µ,F ), we have that ti+1k ≤ tı˜+1k ,
and the proof is complete.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4.37. A direct corollary of Corollary 4.35 (Theorem 4.15)
and Theorem 4.36.
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4.38. A direct corollary of Corollary 4.35 (Theorem 4.22)
and Theorem 4.36.
A.5. Proof of Theorem 6.2
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.2. The fact that each such strategy profile is a super-strong
equilibrium with load ˜`gj on each producer j ∈ Png of good g ∈ {1, 2} (and with the
market split between the producers of each good as in the one-good scenario of Sec-
tion 5) is an immediate consequence of Theorem 5.2; we therefore show that no other
super-strong equilibrium exists. We give a proof for atomless µ; the proof for general
µ is similar and is left to the reader. Let
(
(tgj , θ
g
j )
)g∈{1,2}
j∈Png be a super-strong equilibrium
among producers, given in polar coordinates. For every g ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ Png , let `gj be
the load on producer j of good g in
(
(tgj , θ
g
j )
)g∈{1,2}
j∈Png .
We begin by noting that a producer j ∈ Png of good g ∈ {1, 2} may still secure a load
of at least ˜`gj by choosing the origin as its location, and so `
g
j ≥ ˜`gj for every g ∈ {1, 2}
and j ∈ Png . As for every g ∈ {1, 2}, we have
∑
j∈Png `
g
j ≤ µ(T ) =
∑
j∈Png
˜`g
j , we have
that `gj = ˜`
g
j for every j ∈ Png , i.e. the load on every producer is as in the super-strong
equilibria described in the statement of the theorem.
For every g ∈ {1, 2}, let pig ∈ Png ! be a permutation s.t. tgpig(0) ≤ t
g
pig(1)
≤ · · · ≤ tgpig(n−1).
For every g ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ Pn, define mgj ,
∑j−1
k=0
˜`g
pig(k)
; by the genericity assumption
on partial sums of producer-equilibrium loads, and by positivity of equilibrium loads,
we have m1j 6= m2k for every j ∈ Pn1 and k ∈ Pn2 s.t. either j > 0 or k > 0.
As for every j ∈ Png , the distance tgpig(j) is accessible by at least all consumer types
consuming a positive amount from any of the producers pig(j), pig(j + 1), . . . , pig(n − 1)
of good g, we have that µ
(
[0, tgpi(j))
) ≤ ∑j−1k=0 ˜`gpig(k) = mgj for every j ∈ Png . There-
fore, deviating to a super-strong equilibrium as in the statement of the theorem, while
maintaining the order of distances from the origin among producers of the same good,
harms no producer. If tgpig(j) < Max
{
t ∈ T | µ([0, t)) ≤ mgj} for some g ∈ {1, 2} and
j ∈ Png , then producer pig(j) of load g strictly benefits from such a deviation; therefore,
tgpig(j) = Max
{
t ∈ T | µ([0, t)) ≤ mgj} for every g ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ Png . Therefore, as µ
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is atomless, the market is split between the producers of each good as in the one-good
scenario of Section 5.
Assume for contradiction that not all producer strategies in
(
(tgj , θ
g
j )
)g∈{1,2}
j∈Png lie on the
same ray from the origin. Therefore, w.l.o.g. there exist producers j ∈ Pn1 and k ∈ Pn2
whose strategies do not lie on the same ray, s.t. t1j ≤ t2k and either j = pi1(n1 − 1) or
t2k ≤ t1pi1(pi1−1(j)+1). (The w.l.o.g. assumption refers to the part played by each good.)
If j < pi1(n1 − 1), then as µ is atomless, we have µ
(
[0, t2k)
)
= m2
pi−12 (k)
6= m1
pi−11 (j)+1
=
µ
(
[0, t1pi1(pi1−1(j)+1))
)
and so t2k < t
1
pi1(pi1−1(j)+1); otherwise, since by assumption
˜`2
k > 0
and as µ is atomless, we have t2k < 1. Either way, by market split there exists ε > 0
s.t. almost all (w.r.t. µ) consumer types d ∈ [t2k, t2k + ε) consume a positive amount both
from producer j of good 1 and from producer k of good 2. Let c be the circumference of
the triangle whose vertices are the origin, (t1j , θ1j ) and (t2k, θ
2
k); as the latter two do not
lie on the same ray from the origin, (t1j , θ1j ) is not a convex combination of the origin
and (t2k, θ
2
k), and so by the triangle inequality we have c > 2t
2
k. By definition of c, no
consumer with type d ∈ [t2k, c2 ) can consume from both producer j of good 1 and producer
k of good 2 without violating the consumer’s QoS limit. By combining these two, we
have that for δ , min
{
c
2 − t2k, ε} > 0, almost all consumer types d ∈ [t2k, t2k + δ) consume
from both these producers, while no such consumer consumes from both of them — a
contradiction, since by definition of t2k we have that δ > 0 implies µ
(
[t2k, t
2
k + δ)
)
> 0.
We note that the requirements in Theorem 6.2, both for every producer-equilibrium
load to be positive and for the genericity of partial sums of producer-equilibrium loads,
are required. Indeed, any producer with zero producer-equilibrium load can be moved
to any ray without destabilizing the equilibrium. Furthermore, if there exist permu-
tations pi1 ∈ Pn1 ! and pi2 ∈ Pn2 ! and producers j ∈ Pn1 \ {0} and k ∈ Pn2 \ {0} s.t.∑j−1
i=0
˜`1
pi1(i)
=
∑k−1
i=0
˜`2
pi2(i)
, then moving all producers j′ of good 1 s.t. pi1(j′) ≥ pi1(j) and
all producers k′ of good 2 s.t. pi2(k′) ≥ pi2(k) together to any ray does not destabilize the
equilibrium either.
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